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Why did anti-migrant parties emerge and 
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"The process of migration should be welcomed and encourage."  
Indermit S Gill, chief economist of Europe and Central Asia, World Bank, while releasing 
the 2009 World Development Report in New Delhi. (“India needs to encourage 
migration: World Bank”, Financial Express March 12, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
“The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into 
two peoples, two 
cultures, and two languages.” 
Samuel P. Huntington, in “The Hispanic Challenge” (Foreign Policy March/April 2004) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Since the first migration out of Africa, human beings have moved from their 
place of origin to new places.1 In recorded human history, this movement of people has 
rarely been to undiscovered, unpopulated lands and rarely without opposition from 
existing inhabitants. Today, local opposition towards international migrants in the name 
of economic self-interest is a familiar part of public debate in Western countries.2 Such a 
reaction is not limited to the developed world however, as recent anti-immigrant 
                                                 
1 Gibbons, Ann. “HUMAN ANTHROPOLOGY: Modern Men Trace Ancestry to African Migrants.” 
Science 292 (2001): 1051 – 1052. The article can also be accessed at 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/292/5519/1051b> 
2 Financial Express. “Fire foreign workers first: Rep Sen.” 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/fire-foreign-workers-first-rep-sen-to-microsoft/415082/ 
(accessed Mar 10, 2009). 
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rhetoric in South Africa illustrates.3 I focus my attention on another variation of this 
theme. Through an examination of Mumbai, Bangalore, and Delhi, this thesis attempts 
to identify the conditions under which local opposition develops towards internal 
migrants in a multiethnic, democratic state. 
 
Implications for India  
In India, there are cleavages of language, ethnicity, and religion that have 
figured prominently in the literature on migration and ethnic conflict.4 In this study of 
three major Indian cities, my intention is to add to our understanding of the conditions 
under which migration induces local opposition. The definitive work on this topic, Myron 
Weiner’s Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India, was published in 1978.5 
He examined movements demanding preferential hiring policies for members of the 
indigenous ethnic group, or “sons of the soil,” in five regions and cities of India. The 
sparse amount of work on migration and ethnic conflict in India since then suggests the 
salience of the issue has diminished significantly.6 It is quite likely the Hindu-Muslim divide 
                                                 
3 The Economist. “Developing countries and migration.” 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDNRGTPT (accessed Feb 01, 
2009). 
4 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Why Democracy Survives.” Journal of democracy 9 (1998):36 – Varshney 
discusses the different cleavages in India, noting that all of them except for the Hindu-Muslim 
cleavage are specific to and contained within their respective regions.  
5 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978 
6 In a search of the literature, I did not find any other comprehensive works of nativist movements 
across the length and breadth of India. There were studies of particular movements or regions, 
such as Mary Fainsod Katzenstein’s The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay, 
Sanjib Baruah’s India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, and Dipankar Gupta’s 
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became more visible and overshadowed the earlier regional chauvinism, of which 
“sons of the soil” agitations were a part. The growth of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) from the 1980s through the mid-1990s supports this.7 The shifting of 
the Shiv Sena, a Mumbai-based nativist party Weiner studied, from its regional, nativist 
stance towards a broader Hindu nationalist stance exemplifies this paradigm shift.8  
In the last national elections in 2004, the two major electoral coalitions were the 
right-of-center, BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and the left-of-center, Congress-
led United Progressive Alliance.9 Recently there has been a resurgence of regionalism, 
with the announcement of a “Third Front” electoral coalition of regional parties for 
upcoming national elections.10 A new anti-migrant campaign in Mumbai by the 
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena against migrants from the states Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
further suggests that the key cleavage in Indian politics is no longer the Hindu-Muslim 
divide.11 If regionalism is returning, continued migration across India’s regions means the 
“sons of the soil” issue could return as well.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Nativism in a metropolis : the Shiv Sena in Bombay but even these were few and concentrated 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
7 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Why Democracy Survives.” Journal of democracy 9 (1998): 43-45 
8 Palshikar, Suhas “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” Economic and Political Weekly 3 April 
2004: 1499 
9 BBC. “How India’s elections were won and lost.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3711395.stm (accessed March 1, 2009) 
10 BBC. “Third front launched in India.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7939276.stm 
(accessed March 1, 2009) 
11 “Respect Local Culture or Suffer: Raj Thackeray” 10 Feb 2008 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2770188.cms> Times of India 
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Wider Implications 
Local opposition to migrants is not merely a phenomenon particular to India but 
is seen in many societies. A case in point is migration of southern ethnic groups in 
Nigeria to the predominantly-Islamic north leading to calls for Sharia law.12 Indonesia, 
another multiethnic state, has seen violence between the indigenous Dayak people of 
West Kalimantan and migrants from the island of Madura.13 Even authoritarian states 
such as China are not strangers to this phenomenon.14 Moreover, worldwide internal, 
intra-national migration is expected to increase given the opportunity for economic 
advancement it offers.15 An understanding of internal migration’s political 
consequences could encourage responsible actions on the part of governments, civil 
society, and other key actors.  
Organization of the Thesis 
                                                 
12 Anugwom, Edlyne Eze. “Contested Terrain: Economic migration, Islamic sharia law and ethno-
religious conflict in Nigeria.” African Study Monographs Vol 29. No 4. (December 2008): 159-181 
13 Peluso, Nancy Lee, and Harwell, Emily. “Territory, Custom and the Cultural Politics of Ethnic War 
in West Kalimantan, Indonesia.” in Peluso, Nancy Lee, and Watts, Michael. Violent Environments, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001: 83 
14The Economist. “Fire on the Roof of the World.” 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10870258&top_story=1 
(accessed March 1, 2009) 
15 World Development Report 2009 "Reshaping Economic Geography." Washington DC: The 
World Bank Group, 2009: 153 – See the sub-heading “Internal labor mobility—growing rapidly, 
despite restrictions.” 
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 This thesis is organized in the following manner. The Theory chapter develops 
theoretical explanations for local opposition to migrants by drawing upon existing 
literature. The primary aim of this critical review of literature, both international and 
India-specific, was to offer hypotheses for each of the three cities. In the Data and 
Analysis chapter, I present my findings and consider explanations developed in the 
Theory chapter, alternative explanations where my earlier ones are insufficient, and the 
limitations of these findings. Following this, I revisit my initial hypotheses and consider the 
implications of my findings.  
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THEORY 
Broadly, this thesis and much of the literature I draw upon concerns the political 
consequences of one ethnic group moving into the territory of another group. An anti-
migrant reaction is one possible political consequence. A second possibility is that 
migrants may be integrated, and no longer be considered outsiders. For this thesis 
however, it is assumed that India’s internal migrants and their descendents continue to 
be considered “migrants” or “outsiders.”16 Though the question of when or if migrants 
can become native is of great importance, it will be properly addressed in the 
Conclusion. The following pages critically review international and India-specific 
literature on migration and ethnic conflict, attitudes towards immigration, and political 
competition. I draw on this literature to develop appropriate hypotheses and methods 
for internal migration in India. 
 
International Migration 
Prejudice 
                                                 
16 The question of when migrants (or their descendents) are no longer considered migrants is a 
very pertinent but difficult one. Even some anti-migrant political parties would rather not address 
it, as Mary F Katzenstein notes in Preferential Policies: The Shiv Sena in Bombay. Though I assume 
that migrants and their descendents remain “migrants” or “outsiders” rather than eventually 
becoming “sons of the soil,” I am mindful of the broader normative question this raises. For further 
discussion of whether and when migrants and their descendents become locals, please see 
pg.66 (Conclusion).  
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One possible factor behind opposition to immigration is racial or cultural 
prejudice. Such prejudice is “likely to be related to the ethnic origin of immigrants,” and 
be stronger “the more dissimilar the immigrant population is ethnically and culturally.”17 
Dustmann and Preston in their 2000 study on “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes 
to Immigration” use data from multiple rounds of the British Social Attitude Survey. 
Questions on this survey dealt with ethnic groups both similar to and relatively different 
from the indigenous population as well as welfare and labor competition concerns. 
Their most interesting finding was that “racial attitudes” have a “quantitatively and 
statistically” strong impact on “hostility to immigration from the West Indies or from 
Asia.”18 Racial and cultural factors had no impact however on attitudes towards 
immigration from Australia and New Zealand and only a weak impact on attitudes 
towards immigration from Europe. While these racial factors affected the attitudes of 
people of all education levels, this was most visible amongst the least educated, 
suggesting another possibility discussed below.  
 
Economic Self-Interest 
It is possible that racial and cultural prejudices that inform opinions on immigration 
are really epiphenomena of economic self-interest concerns.19 Much recent scholarship 
                                                 
17 Dustmann, Christian, and Preston, Ian “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to 
Immigration” IZA DP No. 190 (August 2000): 4 
18 Dustmann and Preston: 23 – In their data, “Asia” refers primarily to India and Pakistan with the 
term “Asians” used to describe these nationalities and others from the Indian Subcontinent 
19 The term epiphenomenon is used in this thesis to denote a phenomenon that is not a causal 
factor itself but a “side-effect” of a causal factor. For example, the causal factor behind local 
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has examined economic self-interest explanations, focusing on individual education or 
skill level and immigration preferences. Normally, an increase in the labor supply, such 
as that due to immigration, increases labor competition and depresses wages, hurting 
the low-skilled most. As expected, their analysis of 1992, 1994, and 1996 National 
Election Studies (NES) survey data reveals “a robust link between labor market skills and 
preferences” on immigration.20 Additional findings that union members will in some 
cases favor immigration restrictions further support their conclusions.21 The less-skilled 
want more restrictions on immigration and the more-skilled want fewer, consistent with 
factor-proportions analysis and the Heckscher-Ohlin model.22  
However, their claim in favor of an education – labor market competition link in 
explaining greater anti-immigrant sentiment among the less-skilled is unconvincing in 
certain respects. They control for ideology and gender but fail to analyze questions in 
the NES survey data that directly ask for opinions on immigrants of certain ethnic 
groups.23 Their only evidence that education has a role in determining economic self-
                                                                                                                                                             
opposition to migrants could be fear of labor competition. However, locals may exhibit make 
display racial and cultural prejudice towards migrants even though their primary grievances are 
economic, not cultural. In such a scenario, racial and cultural prejudice is an epiphenomenon of 
economic concerns.  
20 Scheve, Kenneth F, and Slaughter, Matthew J. “Labor Market Competition and Individual 
Preferences over Immigration Policy.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 1 
(Feb., 2001): 144  
21 Scheve and Slaughter: 143 
22 For more information on this general equilibrium model of international trade that emphasizes 
the respective factor endowments of trading states, see Ohlin, B., 1933, Interregional and 
International Trade, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
23 Scheve and Slaughter: 137 - 138 see mention of questions pertaining to Asians and Hispanics 
on the NES survey on bottom of page 137. 
12 
 
interest rather than one of socialization and shaping attitudes are broad, general 
questions on tolerance.24 It is entirely possible that more specific questions involving 
specific ethnic groups or foreigners rather than any type of people who are different 
would elicit a different response. Even their central claim of labor market competition is 
somewhat weakened by the fact that high-skilled workers are not shown to support 
more restrictions on high-skilled labor.  
Controlling for non-economic factors, Anna Maria Mayda also finds that “economic 
variables play a key and robust role in preference formation over immigration policy.”25 
Her work also employs the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and factor proportions analysis 
labor model while a cross-country data set suggests greater external validity than 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) or Dustmann and Preston (2000). However, she establishes 
a relationship between skill-level and immigration preference that in contrast to Scheve 
and Slaughter’s is conditional upon per capita GDP. In high per capita GDP countries, 
“individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration preferences” while it is 
negatively correlated in low per capita GDP countries.26 From analysis of a smaller set of 
countries, she also finds that individuals in occupations where immigration increases the 
labor supply are less likely to be pro-immigration.27 Controlling for public opinion data 
on crime, cultural and national identity, and other non-economic issues did not affect 
                                                 
24 Scheve and Slaughter: 142 
25 Mayda, Anna Maria. “Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual 
attitudes toward immigrants.” IZA DP No. 1115 (April 2004): 2 
26 Mayda: 3 
27 Ibid 
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this correlation of skill and preference. Still, there was significant correlation of crime and 
cultural concerns with attitudes as well as a strong, negative impact due to racism.28 
Thus, Mayda concludes that economic factors have a robust and key role, while still 
seeing a role for non-economic factors.  
O’Rourke and Sinnott in their 2004 study “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes 
Towards Immigration” begin by considering the end of the 19th century’s unrestricted 
immigration policies. Approaching the paradox of why governments restrict 
immigration despite its compelling economic logic, they also distinguish between non-
economic (racism, xenophobia, forms of nationalism) and individual economic self-
interest explanations. They refer here to Timmer and Williamson’s finding that rising 
economic inequality was the central concern while cultural/racial concerns were mere 
epiphenomena of economic self-interest concerns.29 Explanations based on widening 
ethnic gaps between the native-born and immigrants as well as any sort of xenophobia 
or nationalism were rejected by Timmer and Williamson. However, O’Rourke and Sinnott 
sought to determine if economic factors alone were still sufficient to explain opposition 
to immigration. As with Scheve and Slaughter (2001), they examined individual voters’ 
attitudes, though their cross-country survey data places them closer to Mayda (2004).  
In approaching the analysis, they offered two hypotheses that are of interest for 
studying internal migration in India. Firstly, they expected to confirm Mayda’s finding 
                                                 
28 Mayda: 26  
29 Timmer, S Ashley and Williamson, G Jeffrey. “Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor 
Markets, Policy Interactions, and Globalization Backlash” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(Autumn 1998) 
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that the high-skilled are more pro-immigration in rich countries and more anti-
immigration in poor countries.30 Additionally, they believed that inequality would play a 
role in the relation between skills and anti-immigrant sentiment. Their contention was 
that if inequality increases (decreases) then anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the 
high-skilled increases (decreases).31 Their findings were close to Mayda’s as they did 
concede “that attitudes towards immigration are not a function of economic interests 
alone.”32 A pertinent result, “robust to all specifications,” was that “patriotism, and 
especially chauvinism” had “a large positive effect on anti-immigrant sentiment.”33 Still, 
they found that for explaining the preferences of those in the labor market, “standard 
economic theory does a pretty good job.”34 Their results on the interaction of skill and 
immigration preferences conditional on per capita GDP also match Mayda’s. However, 
they differ in concluding that the effect is stronger “in more equal countries than in 
more unequal ones.”35 
                                                 
30 O’Rourke, KH and Sinnott, R. “The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration” 
European Journal of Political Economy (2006): 5 
31 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 8 
32 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 19 
33 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 13 
34 O’Rourke and Sinnott: Pg. 26 (Table 4), significant impact of independent variables for skill 
upon dependent variable anti-immigrant attitudes for those in the labor force 
35 O’Rourke and Sinnott: 19 
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In direct response to Dustmann and Preston’s findings, Malchow-Moller et al 
examined the role of economic self-interest in a 2006 paper.36 As with the 
aforementioned studies, they make use of a factor proportions model though they look 
at individual job status (employer, employee, unemployed) in addition to education 
level. Their sample of countries was restricted to the EU-15 and Norway – the richest 
countries of Europe. As expected, they found “a strong positive relationship between 
education and the general attitude towards immigration,” in line with Scheve and 
Slaughter, Mayda, and O’Rourke and Sinnott.37  
What set this paper apart however was its more direct test of individual preferences 
for different skill-level immigration.38 The expectation beforehand was that findings 
would match factor proportions analysis, with for example the more-educated favoring 
less-skilled immigration. Unfortunately, the results were not conclusive. A third step 
assessed people’s perceptions of the economic consequences of immigration. This was 
conclusive as the following groups were significantly more opposed to immigration: the 
poor amongst those who believed immigration hurt the poor, workers amongst those 
who believed immigration depressed wages, and welfare recipients amongst those 
who believed immigrants burdened public budgets.39 Thus, this paper offers further, 
                                                 
36 Malchow-Møller, Munch, Schroll, and Skaksen. “Explaining Cross-Country Differences in 
Attitudes towards Immigration in the EU-15” CEBR and Rockwool Foundation Research Unit 
Discussion Paper (May 2005) 
37 Malchow-Moller et al: 16 
38 Malchow-Moller et al: 8 
39 Malchow-Moller et al: 16 
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deeper, and more geographically diverse confirmation of the role of economic self-
interest in opposition to immigration.  
 
Education as Socialization 
At present, there are explanations emphasizing racial and cultural prejudice on the 
one hand and economic self-interest on the other. There is one possibility however that 
incorporates elements of both sides of the “ideology versus interests” debate, of both 
the economic and non-economic variable camps.40 I would argue that education, 
along with determining job opportunities, has a socializing effect. Education can shape 
cultural attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners more generally. Hiscox and 
Hainmueller in a 2007 study on education and immigration preferences consider this 
somewhat forgotten aspect. They begin by noting that in much of the literature, “the 
immigration debate is to a large extent about economics” where a “critical battle line” 
separates “high-skilled and low-skilled workers.”41  
Hiscox and Hainmueller question this repeated assertion of Mayda, Scheve and 
Slaughter, and other authors. They note that even the “most sophisticated economic 
models are quite equivocal” on the actual impact of immigrants on labor market 
                                                 
40 R Wilkes, N Guppy, L Farris. “"No Thanks, We're Full": Individual Characteristics, National 
Context, and Changing Attitudes Toward Immigration” International Migration Review (2008): 
302  
41 Hiscox, MJ and Hainmueller, J. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward 
Immigration in Europe” International Organization (2007): 1 
17 
 
dynamics.42 Moreover, the findings of Dustmann and Preston we considered earlier 
favor a cultural explanation involving racism, nationalist feeling, or xenophobia.43 One 
school of thought emphasizes economic self-interest based upon one’s education. The 
other sees increasing education leading to a more tolerant view of immigrants. The 
findings of Hiscox and Hainmueller support the latter view, as “people with higher 
education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants 
come from and their likely skill attributes.”44  
For example, one would expect people of a given “education level” to oppose 
similar skill-level immigration if labor competition fears were present. However, this was 
not borne out by the data. The authors emphasized that data showed “more educated 
respondents” were “significantly less racist and place far greater value on cultural 
diversity.”45 Employing the European Social Survey, which asked questions on rich versus 
poor country immigrants and European versus non-European immigrants, they were 
able to determine the role of cultural/racial beliefs.46 Such cultural/racial beliefs 
accounted for about “65% of the estimated effect of education on support for 
immigration.”47 As the authors note, “immigration brings to the fore very different 
                                                 
42 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 2 
43 Dustmann and Preston 
44 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32 
45 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32 
46 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 10 See the paragraph mentioning “four different versions of this 
question in which the source…” 
47 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 32 
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conceptions of national identity – involving different views about the importance of 
ethnicity, religion, and language.”48 
Their findings were also quite robust in a number of respects. Their finding held when 
measuring “education level” with qualifications or occupational measures. Objections 
they noted included survey response bias, misperceptions about immigrants, and cross-
national labor market variations. Survey response bias could for example involve the 
more-educated having a greater desire to appear less prejudiced, hiding their real 
attitudes. However, any study drawing upon public opinion data including those I have 
covered will be prone to such bias. Perceptions amongst the low-skilled that the 
education level or labor market effect of migrants is greater than it actually is could 
lead to greater anti-immigrant sentiment. The authors contend however that “the 
clearest (and perhaps the only) explanation” for such a misperception would be the 
same one linking xenophobia and education that they found.49  
Nonetheless, I do have some concerns. Their sample was of European countries, 
suggesting one may see different results in poorer countries or ones with less extensive 
welfare systems, such as India. Moreover, they note that Western education systems are 
often designed “explicitly to increase social tolerance.” Whether this is true of the Indian 
education system is debateable. In terms of internal validity, it is also unclear whether 
French and Dutch high school graduates can be considered the same. Assuming 
French and Indian high school graduates, or Indian graduates of a private high school 
                                                 
48 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 33 
49 Hiscox and Hainmueller: 35 
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and a rural government high school have had the same socializing experience is even 
more problematic. It remains unclear whether education’s mechanism is a labor 
market or tolerance through socialization one. Still, the basic relation remains that the 
lower the education level, the greater anti-immigrant attitudes are. 
  
The State of the Economy 
Analyzing Canadian Gallup surveys from 1975 to 2000, Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 
find that “the state of the national economy has a relatively uniform effect across 
groups” on attitudes.50 While limited to one country, the result of Wilkes, Guppy, and 
Farris does suggest that during economic downturns, one should expect greater anti-
immigrant sentiment. Indeed, this finding confirms the initial paradox that motivated this 
paper. This was indeed a statistically robust result, but it does stand alone as other 
studies have not discussed this possibility. Moreover, testing this proposition is not 
possible for Mumbai, Bangalore, and Delhi. None of these cities have seen a prolonged 
economic downturn in this timeframe nor are there adequate public opinion surveys in 
this context.  
 
The Rate of Immigration 
In addition to examining the effect of the state of the economy, Wilkes, Guppy, and 
Farris also analyzed the impact of the rate of immigration. Specifically, they considered 
                                                 
50 Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris: 302 
20 
 
the effect of variation over time in Canada’s immigration rate on attitudes. There can 
also of course be geographic variation. In the case of the United States, one can speak 
of certain states and cities as immigration gateways, where the native-born interact 
with larger numbers of immigrants than elsewhere. For variation over time though, they 
“found little effect of annual variation in the rate of immigration.”51 Scheve and 
Slaughter, in addition to writing on the education – labor competition link, had also 
explored this factor. Their same 2001 study finds that the skills-opinion relationship is no 
stronger in high-immigration communities.52 They do suggest however that the link 
between skills and immigration preferences could be connected with “mainstream 
redistributive politics over which political parties often contest elections.”53 
 
National Salience and Local Opposition  
 Focusing on the local level, a 2007 paper by Daniel J. Hopkins develops the 
theory of politicized change to explain perceptions of immigrants as threatening in the 
United States. He establishes that sudden local demographic change is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for sustained anti-immigrant attitudes, which also require “external, 
politicizing agents.”54 The theory of “politicized change” states that a social cleavage 
                                                 
51 Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris: 325 
52 Scheve and Slaughter: 144 
53 Scheve and Slaughter: 144 
54 Hopkins, Daniel J. “Threatening Changes: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke 
Local Opposition” Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for the Study of American Politics – Yale University 
(September 6, 2007): 33 
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or political issue can become relevant if it is “amenable to framing but not consistently 
framed” by national political rhetoric.55 He finds that whenever the immigration issue is 
raised nationally, communities that have experienced a recent influx of immigrants see 
anti-immigrant measures and opinions develop.  
To make his case, he notes the timing of opinion swings and ordinances. A prime 
example is such swings “in late 2005 and 2006, just after immigration became nationally 
salient,” which neither the state of the economy nor economic self-interest nor 
socialization can account for.56 His measurement of “national salience” with surveys of 
television and print media mentions of the word “immigration, of “local opposition” with 
geo-coded survey and local ordinances, and changes in the share of immigrants with 
census data is reasonable. The only difficultly here, which I faced for migration in India 
as well, is that census data is too infrequently collected. 1990 and 2000 data indicating 
a sudden influx of immigrants may not capture specific fluctuations in the mid-90s nor 
can fluctuations in 2006 be noted. 
Moreover, his claim that the change in the number of immigrants rather than the 
level is necessary for politicized change has implications for the Indian case. Perhaps 
change in interstate migration figures over time rather than the absolute number of 
migrants (and their descendents) matters. Yet what of the possibility that a large, 
established community may attract further immigrants? In the Indian context especially, 
                                                 
55 Hopkins: 33 
56 Hopkins: 3 
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a large existing population of migrants (and their descendents) may be more 
electorally important than the rate at which additional migrants are arriving. 
The “national salience” component is quite acceptable, though one could 
argue it is epiphenomenal of economic self-interest. One outlier situation of national 
salience but no corresponding local opposition was the Elian Gonzalez episode, where 
no economic self-interest was present.57 Broad economic concerns that certain workers 
are facing increased labor market competition may lead to national rhetoric. 
Communities where this increased labor competition is most felt due to substantial 
recent immigration would then see this rhetoric shaping public opinion and local 
ordinances. Still, it was relatively “wealthier, larger, and better educated” communities 
that considered anti-immigrant proposals from 2000 to 2006.58 
Lastly, it is worth noting that while Guppy, Wilkes, and Farris found that the state 
of the economy had a uniform effect on attitudes in Canada, Hopkins’ examination of 
the “September 11th Effect” challenges this.59 He found that in October 2001 anti-
immigrant feeling rose in counties with growing immigrant populations but abated by 
March of 2002, even though the economic outlook changed little.60 Hopkins has 
provided much to consider, though for his insights will need some adaptation. Firstly, in 
a situation of internal migration where migrants can vote, their absolute level may 
                                                 
57 BBC. “What happened to Elian Gonzalez?” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4471099.stm 
(accessed February 1st 2009) 
58 Hopkins: 29 
59 Hopkins: 15, title mentions 9/11 effect 
60 Hopkins: 16, 17 
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matter as much or more than changes in the rate of migration. Secondly, “national 
salience” may have to be defined more broadly to incorporate regional and ethnic 
demands, political competition, and other phenomena beyond the issue of migration 
alone.   
 
Immigrants and Electoral Outcomes 
 In a more recent study, Gerdes and Wadensjö further explore the local political 
implications of immigration through its impact on Danish municipal election outcomes.61 
They find that anti-immigrant parties “enjoy support in local elections in municipalities 
with an increased ‘share of non-Western immigrants.’”62 Initially, they had trouble 
accounting for the different set of candidates and parties competing in each 
municipality and each new election cycle. Their solution was to measure the 
dependent variable of support for an anti-immigrant party as a binary variable.63 On 
the independent variable side, they first considered changes in the number of non-
Western immigrants and then the total number of immigrants (including second and 
later generation immigrants).  
                                                 
61 Gerdes and Wadensjö, “The Impact of Immigration on Election Outcomes in Danish 
Municipalities” iza.org (2008) 
62 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 23 
63 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 10, Regression estimations involved a log-form binary dependent 
variable, “indicating that party i either did or did not get a vote,” with the independent variable 
given by the change in the immigrant population. 
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In their regressions, entity and time fixed effects controlled for heterogeneity of 
municipalities and variance over time.64 The annual number of refugees receiving 
government assistance was used as an instrument for the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ though they would have preferred actual numbers of refugees assigned 
under a program of dispersing refugees across the country. Given the variety of 
methods and their exploration of both changes and levels, this limitation is not of great 
concern.  
In their concluding discussion they suggest that “people seem less influenced by 
direct personal experience of immigrants than by the general political debate.”65 Such 
a statement echoes Hopkins but is not supported by their data and analysis. 
Immigration has been a topic of political debate in Denmark and they found that non-
Western immigration positively impacts the local vote shares of two anti-immigrant 
parties. What they have not done is examine, through public opinion surveys or any 
other mechanism, the effect “direct personal experience.”  
What is of perhaps great concern is whether opposition to “non-Western” 
immigrants is actually a case of inter-religious tension. If religion matters, then 
immigration of “non-Western” peoples predominantly of a different religion may cause 
no change in the local vote shares of anti-immigrant parties. They also do not consider 
situations where large numbers of immigrants can vote, as they would be able to in the 
Indian case. Still, this study provides a framework for examining (and reinforces) the link 
                                                 
64 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 11, This allowed them to isolate “the effect of (a change in) the (log) 
share of first-generation non-Western immigrants.” 
65 Gerdes and Wadensjö: 25 
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between migration (both changes and levels) and electoral outcomes and further 
supports Hopkins’ findings.  
 
Internal Migration in Multiethnic States 
 Although the above studies situated in Western, developed countries offer 
explanations for local opposition to migrants, the Indian case is different in one 
fundamental respect. India’s experience is one of internal migration in a multiethnic 
state, while the above papers concern international migration and thus have some 
limitations. A recent paper by David Laitin on the likelihood of immigrants as 
participants in a civil war further sheds further light on the importance of this 
difference.66 He stresses that immigrants, or “Newcomers to the Soil” lack the regional 
base that allows “Sons of the Soil” to challenge the state militarily.67 What this implies is 
that for “Newcomers to the Soil,” returning home is an option and thus there is less 
incentive to instigate any sort of ethnic conflict. 
 With the seemingly anomalous case of the Muhajirs in Pakistan, Laitin shows that 
if “regional base” can be understood broadly then even “Newcomers to the Soil” can 
obtain one.68 His description of Urdu-speaking Partition-era refugees from India settling 
                                                 
66 Laitin. “Immigrant Communities and Civil War” International Migration Review (2009) 
67 Laitin: 36 
68 Laitin: 56, He notes that “the social solidarity of these urban communitarians, and the 
impenetrable (to national armies) back alleys of their neighborhoods” meant that “the insurgent 
violence in urban Sindh organized by the sons of immigrants could escalate to attain rural-based 
standards.” 
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in and becoming the majority population of urban Sindh is meant to suggest that 
migrants can challenge the state by building a regional, urban base. In the Indian 
context, this would suggest that sustained migration could allow a non-native group, 
such as Hindi-speakers in Mumbai, to build a regional base at the expense of the 
current “Sons of the Soil.” Fear of a large migrant minority building such a base, i.e. fear 
of “swamping,” could motivate local opposition to migrants.  
 It is precisely such fears of “swamping” that are voiced in the debate over 
Tibet.69 Moreover, in this case, electoral competition is irrelevant as China is a 
multiethnic, authoritarian state. Andrew Martin Fischer notes that “the key issue is not 
whether the population balance has shifted towards the Tibetan or the Han, but that 
the latter have dominated urbanization.”70 His study suggests that interethnic conflict 
between Tibetans, Hui Muslims, and Han Chinese is really a story of economic 
competition in towns, with Tibetan upward mobility blocked by Hui migrants.71 This 
crowding in urban areas could also help further the perception of “swamping” by 
migrants.  
                                                 
69 The Guardian “Tibet could be 'swamped' by mass Chinese settlement after Olympics, says 
Dalai Lama” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/24/tibet.china (accessed January 1, 
2009) 
70 Fischer, Martin “Urban faultlines in Shangri-La: Population and Economic Foundations of Inter-
Ethnic Conflict in the Tibetan Areas of Western China” Crisis States Programme - LSE Working 
Paper no.42 (June 2004): 17 
71 Fischer: 18, “Hence contemporary contestation in these areas takes place in the towns.” And 
“The expansion of Muslim business networks into Tibetan towns leads to heightened competition 
precisely where the chances for Tibetans to integrate into the urban economy should be 
highest.” 
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 However, there is another aspect that might have implications for the Indian 
case. Given public projects in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the “upper range of 
skilled labour is definitely required.”72 The prime jobs are thus almost always inaccessible 
to Tibetans while they face increased competition for lower level jobs as well with the in-
migration of better-qualified Han and Hui. Such a scenario, which may not be reflected 
in general unemployment and education figures, could well occur in Indian states too. 
Jobs in Information Technology (IT) and other new industries often recruit nationally for 
specialized skills, thus excluding locals to some extent. A concurrent influx of low-skilled 
migrants would compound this exclusion by increasing competition for lower level jobs 
as well. In the Indian case, “marginalization from political and economic power” may 
not be as acute as in the case of Tibet. Still, exclusion due to “lower education and skill 
levels” that is exacerbated by “competition over lower-skilled work” is possible and 
would produce anti-migrant sentiment similar to that seen in Tibet. 
 In northern Nigeria, a democratic and multiethnic setting like India, there is a 
situation of local opposition to migrants as well. The local Hausa-Fulani population has 
opposed the in-migration of southerners for reasons of economic self-interest 
concerns.73 Here, the local, Muslim population’s nativist reaction has taken the form of a 
call for Islamic law (Sharia), which the predominantly Christian southerners oppose. 
Edlyne Eze Anugwom notes that “in popular imagergy, the economic promises of 
                                                 
72 Fischer: 22, “Undoubtedly, there is a skills deficit in the region, particularly for the current large-
scale projects that dwarf the local economy, and the upper range of skilled labour is definitely 
required for the province, so long as such projects persist.” 
73 Anugwom: 159 “These distinctions in Nigeria’s pluralistic society have been heightened by 
economic or labor migration, especially by Christian Southerners moving to the core Muslim 
areas in the North.” 
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Sharia often translated literally into the expulsion of outsiders and non-Muslims from their 
economic niches.”74 The Sharia regime, she argues, is thus in practice used to advance 
the economic interests of the native-born at the expense of migrants. In India, I would 
argue that the controversy over migrants celebrating their holidays versus native 
holidays is somewhat similar to the controversy over implementing Sharia.75 On the other 
hand, the impact of Sharia would seem akin to that of preferential policies.  
  
The Indian Case: Internal Migration in a Democratic Multiethnic State 
 Although the international literature provides useful insights, the Indian case 
differs in that it involves migration within a multinational state rather than across national 
borders. Per India’s Constitution, migration across state borders (which are often cultural 
and linguistic borders) is free except in special circumstances.76 As my focus is migration 
to India’s three largest cities, it is worth noting that local urban governing bodies in India 
are weak relative to the governments of their state.77 In Delhi’s case, this is not as 
                                                 
74 Anugwom: 177 
75 I have in mind here the rhetoric of the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, a nativist party in 
Mumbai, against Chhat Puja, a holiday celebrated by the large number of migrants from the 
states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh – “MNS to take on Lalu's Chhat Puja with 'Hatt' Puja” May 20, 
2008 Expressindia.com <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/MNS-to-take-on-Lalus-Chhat-
Puja-with-Hatt-Puja/312088/> 
76 By Article 301 of the Indian Constitution, free movement of citizens within India is allowed, with 
Article 304 requiring presidential approval for a state government to limit movement across its 
borders. 
77 Ren and Weinstein. “The Shanghai Effect” http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/node/127: They note that 
“with states tending to view local governments more as rivals than partners, most states – 
including Maharashtra – have chosen to retain the powers of urban development.” 
29 
 
apparent given that its state government presides over what is effectively the greater 
Delhi urban area.78 Even if a native ethnic group is not a majority in a large city, it more 
often than not will be at the state level and thus nativist demands can be made and 
acted upon at this level.  
 Thus, in focusing on the Indian case there are some points to keep in mind. One 
limitation upon nativist politicians as compared to Western countries is that they cannot 
demand legal restrictions upon migration. On the other hand, politicians can and have 
campaigned for preferential policies for the “sons of the soil,” amongst other groups.79 
Meanwhile, the distribution of power across levels of government in India means that 
one must ideally consider both the local AND state levels of government. National 
elections could also be pertinent as a very prominent nativist party in a given state 
could play a role in forming a governing coalition in Parliament. The following scholars 
focus on ethnic conflict, migration, and political competition in India, providing an 
additional layer of specificity above the broad foundation provided by the 
international literature.  
 
Nativism as Labor Market Protectionism 
The late Myron Weiner’s 1978 Sons of the Soil: Ethnic Conflict in India, although 
written before the present era of national coalition governments and regional parties, 
                                                 
78 The NCT of Delhi is effectively one metropolitan area and thus its CM is like a local executive as 
well as a state-level executive. 
79 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978 
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remains the definitive work on this subject.80 Over several years, he conducted 
fieldwork, analyzed census data, and produced a work comparing and contrasting five 
cases of nativism within India: Assam, the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar (modern 
Jharkhand), the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, Mumbai, and Bangalore. He 
arrived at the conclusion that in India “nativism tends to be associated with a blockage 
to social mobility for the native population by a culturally distinguishable migrant 
population,” placing the ‘sons of the soil’ phenomenon as a question of “social mobility 
versus spatial mobility.”81  
This analysis places him in the company of earlier authors who emphasized labor 
market competition in explaining opposition to immigrants in the developed countries. 
Indeed, Weiner explicitly labeled nativism in India “a protectionist movement” in the 
labor market, demanded by local groups in much the same way infant industries 
demand tariff protections against foreign imports.82 Given the available evidence and 
similar findings elsewhere in the literature, such a claim does not seem controversial. 
Moreover, this is supported by five conditions he established, common to all five cities 
and regions he studied, under which “sons of the soil” sentiments emerge.   
His first condition was that “each area with a nativist population has migrants 
from outside the cultural region.”83 This seems self-evident but difficulty can arise in 
defining a “cultural region.” Language would be an ideal measure but even he found 
                                                 
80 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978 
81 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 293 
82 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 294 
83 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 275 
31 
 
difficulties in this. The case of Telengana saw nativist demands against a wave of 
migrants from coastal Andhra Pradesh despite both groups sharing a language and 
culture with only minor differences in customs. His second condition, “that there must be 
some perceived cultural differences, no matter how small, between the migrants and 
the local community,” was perhaps conceived in anticipation of such situations.84 
Though there may not be one dimension along which “cultural differences” or “cultural 
region” can be defined, this condition will still be useful in approaching each case.  
Measurement is even more difficult for Weiner’s third condition, which states that 
“the local population is likely to be immobile relative to other groups in the 
population.”85 Census data was not available from the Registrar General of India on the 
reported ethnicity of citizens and mother tongue data would only be a crude measure. 
Finding that the data to support this condition was incomplete, Weiner suggested 
instead that there was data to support the inverse condition: “states or regions with a 
high in-migration and a high rate of out-migration tend not to have nativist 
movements.”86 Again, data was not available to test this proposition down to the district 
or city level, though state-level data is available. Thus, for Bangalore and Mumbai, one 
would have to consider in- and out-migration rates for the whole states of Karnataka 
and Maharashtra respectively.  
                                                 
84 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 276 
85 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 278 
86 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 279 
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In the post-liberalization environment, the fourth condition, “the rate and pattern 
of unemployment”, is most interesting.87 In elaborating on this condition, Weiner noted 
India’s growing unemployment, and especially the growing number of educated-
unemployed. In fact, he listed as the fifth condition, that “areas with nativist movements 
have experienced a rapid growth of educational opportunities for the lower middle 
classes.”88 Taken together, one could expect that rising unemployment and increasing 
education levels, along with the first three conditions, would produce a nativist 
backlash.  
 
Political Competition 
One limitation of Myron Weiner’s research for this examination in the post-
liberalization period is that it was conducted at a time of limited political competition. 
While no fault of his own, the fact that his study was conducted in an era when the 
Congress party ruled in most states makes it prudent that I consider additional 
explanations. In particular, political competition explanations of when a party seeks to 
make ethnic identities relevant through actions against a minority are of interest. Many 
states in India have more than two significant parties and interstate migrants often are 
an ethnic minority, living amidst a native, ethnic majority.  
                                                 
87 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 280 
88 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 285 
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Steven Wilkinson in his Votes and Violence found that under certain conditions, 
electoral incentives lead parties to incite ethnic (Hindu-Muslim) violence.89 He sees riots 
and political violence a method for changing “the salience of ethnic issues and 
identities among the electorate in order to build a winning political coalition.”90 Though 
similar to Hopkins with a desire to make certain issues and identities salient, Wilkinson’s 
main finding concerns party fractionalization, i.e. the number of effective political 
parties. He notes that in electoral constituencies “with high levels of party 
fractionalization, such as Bulgaria, Malaysia, and the Indian states of Bihar and Kerala, 
governments will protect minorities in order to hold their existing coalitions together as 
well as preserve their coalition options for the future.”91 However, in two-party situations 
where the party in government does not rely on minority votes, riots are not 
prevented.92 Though his study concerned two religious, or per his definition, ethnic 
groups, it offers insights for this study of the native ethnic group’s reaction to another 
ethnic group (migrants and their descendents).93 If instead of Hindus and Muslims, I 
consider locals and migrants, then I can expect that areas with fewer parties will see 
more anti-migrant sentiment and even violence. 
 
Research Design and Hypotheses    
                                                 
89 Wilkinson, Steven I. Votes and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 
90 Wilkinson: 1 
91 Wilkinson: 237 
92 Wilkinson: 6, see figure 1.1 
93 Wilkinson: 8, Wilkinson uses Weber’s definition of ethnic groups, which he provides 
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 From the literature review I sought to adapt certain findings as hypotheses for the 
Indian case. For example, the literature showed that those with a lower education or 
skill level had less favorable attitudes towards migration. The mechanism for this result 
however, was much debated. Some argued that racial and cultural prejudice toward 
migrants were epiphenomena of labor market competition worries. Others argued that 
education socialized greater tolerance and preference for diversity. Before settling this 
debate in my own mind, I had to consider how to measure these variables.   
 
Research Design 
I identified feasible methods for testing and measuring different variables, 
beginning with a labor competition explanation. The labor competition explanation 
could be tested with data on skill-sets or education level of the local population versus 
those of migrants. In such an analysis, the difference between migrants’ and locals’ skill 
sets and education would be the independent variable. With a greater “difference” 
one would expect to see less of the dependent variable of “anti-migrant sentiment” as 
migrants and locals would not be competing for the same jobs. While in this case 
census data for the independent variable may not be very precise, measuring the 
dependent variable poses even more challenges.  
 Quantifying “anti-migrant sentiment” would be best done with opinion polls such 
as the European Social Surveys or Canadian Gallup surveys of aforementioned studies. 
Surveys on attitudes towards internal migration in India were not available, though I 
would look forward to conducting such a survey as part of future research on this topic. 
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Another ideal measure would have been police reports of violence or some similar 
dataset on ethnic or “language” riots similar to that of Hindu-Muslim riots developed by 
Wilkinson and Varshney.94 If such a survey or dataset were not available, developing 
one through either surveys or a review of media sources and official records at different 
levels of government would be best. 
Within the scope of this thesis, collecting data for a survey or dataset similar to 
the Wilkinson-Varshney dataset is not possible. In lieu of such measures, I will measure 
the dependent variable of “anti-migrant sentiment” indirectly. When nativist parties are 
present and electoral data is available, their electoral success will be considered a 
proxy for “anti-migrant sentiment.” I will also examine scholarly work on nativist 
organizations, media reports, and statements of public figures for a sense of how 
politically salient the “sons of the soil” issue is. These methods represent the best 
alternative, given practical constraints, for measuring the dependent variable of “anti-
migrant sentiment.” 
 
Hypotheses 
Having identified some methods and measures as well as feasibility concerns, I 
then developed a set of general explanations and specific hypotheses. Firstly, I 
adapted Myron Weiner’s conditions. In doing so, I also drew upon the labor 
competition literature. Educated preferences unfortunately could not be easily tested 
                                                 
94 “Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, Version 2” 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04342  (accessed February 28, 2009) 
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as the necessary public opinion data was not available. It is also a problematic 
explanation as the quality of matriculation, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, 
and other levels of education differs greatly across states, school types, neighborhoods, 
etc. Furthermore, Myron Weiner’s depiction of “sons of the soil” movements as “labor 
protectionist” and the preferential labor policy demands of such movements led me to 
favor a labor competition explanation:95   
1. LABOR COMPETITION: Nativist sentiment will develop in these cities if the 
following conditions are met: 
a. Migrants perceived as culturally distinct are arriving in the area. 
b. The native ethnic group is relatively immobile, as measured by ratio of 
in-migrants to out-migrants. 
c. Unemployment and native education levels have been increasing. 
Given the explosive growth of parties since liberalization, I also employed 
Wilkinson’s findings for developing hypotheses. The nativist issue has in the past given 
rise to new political parties in Mumbai and the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. 
Moreover, it may explain more extreme and violent incidents, beyond mere anti-
migrant rhetoric. The demographic change condition of Hopkins’ “politicized change” 
approach can also be incorporated. His second condition – that the issue be nationally 
salient – can be assumed to be already met given the proliferation of regional, caste, 
and other identity-based parties. Testing his full “politicized change” approach with a 
                                                 
95 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 294 
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survey of media reports, public opinion surveys, and other data would be ideal but is 
simply not possible. Nonetheless, combining the findings of Wilkinson and Hopkins 
produces a political competition explanation:  
2. POLITICAL COMPETITION: Parties will champion the nativist issue if the 
following conditions are met: 
a. Migrants perceived as culturally distinct are arriving in the area. 
b. There is a recent demographic change due to migration. 
c. There is an electoral incentive to take a nativist stance.  
Though these general, open-ended explanations were developed, I offered 
more simple hypotheses prior to data analysis. For each city, I offered hypotheses on 
the expected level of nativism as well as the role of different factors.  These hypotheses, 
listed on the next page, drew upon the general explanations given above but are more 
easily verifiable and city-specific. 
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  Labor 
Competition 
Political 
Competition 
Expected “Level” 
of Nativism 
Nativist 
Party 
M
u
m
b
a
i 
Unemployment 
↓  
 
NO EFFECT 
Political 
competition 
(regional parties) ↑ 
 
NATIVISM ↑  
HIGH: Political 
parties have won 
elections with the 
issue and there 
has been 
violence in the 
past. Mumbai 
also has more 
regional parties 
than in earlier 
years, each with 
no incentive to 
protect migrants. 
Yes, there 
is one 
major 
party that 
has ruled 
the city 
and the 
state as 
well as a 
splinter 
party. 
B
a
n
g
a
lo
re
 
Unemployment 
↓   
 
 
NO EFFECT 
Recent 
demographic 
change? YES 
Migration 
↑ 
 
NATIVISM ↑ 
MEDIUM: There 
have been 
spontaneous riots 
in the past but no 
nativist party has 
actually seized 
power in a 
fashion similar to 
the Shiv Sena in 
Mumbai.  
Yes, a 
small 
party is 
present 
D
e
lh
i 
“Unemployment 
↑” and “native 
immobility (YES)”  
 
NATIVISM ↑ 
Electoral 
incentives for 
nativism? NO 
 
NO EFFECT 
LOW:  Labor 
competition is 
present but there 
has been no 
violence. Also, 
the lack of a 
nativist party 
implies nativism is 
electorally 
disadvantageous. 
No such 
party is 
present. 
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DATA AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, I first examine the level of nativist sentiment in each of 3 cities, 
drawing on evidence from electoral data, news reports, and interviews and statements 
of public figures. I then discuss and explain these findings drawing heavily on the 
Census of India for the years 1991 and 2001. As a point of clarification, terms such as 
“migrant” and “sons of the soil” will be used in a very strict sense. Henceforth, any 
mention of “migrants,” “migration,” or “outsiders” refers strictly to interstate migration, 
unless specified otherwise. Likewise, the terms “sons of the soil” and “native” or “local” 
refer to the indigenous ethno-linguistic group of a given state. Meanwhile, “nativism,” 
“nativist sentiment,” and “anti-migrant sentiment” refer to “local opposition to 
migrants.” The larger normative question these definitions raise is something I explore in 
my Conclusion.96 
 
Assessing Nativist Sentiment  
 The ideal way to obtain systematic evidence of “nativist sentiment” would be a 
proper survey of public opinion that would give us individual level data. Unfortunately, 
such surveys do not exist in India. Consequently, to measure the dependent variable, 
                                                 
96 In defining these terms as I have done, I am making the very assumptions that are implicitly 
made by nativist movements such as the Shiv Sena (Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, The Shiv Sena in 
Bombay: Preferential Policies). This raises the normative question of whether and when migrants 
or their descendents can be considered “sons of the soil” akin to the indigenous population. As 
stated in the Theory chapter (pg. 5), I properly address this question in the Conclusion (pg. __). 
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the performance of nativist parties is the next best alternative. The presence of a nativist 
party and its electoral performance give some sense of how much support there is for 
nativist ideas. However, for reasons explained below, this proved to be inconclusive. 
Therefore, I also examined the media’s portrayal of migrants and migration as an 
alternative measure of the local reaction to migrants. To this end, I conducted a 
content analysis of major English newspapers published in each city.  
 To ascertain nativist sentiment in each city, I first looked for the presence of a 
nativist political party. Local opposition to migrants is possible even if a nativist political 
party does not exist. However, assuming that parties rationally seek votes, the presence 
of a nativist party is a “hard case” indicating that some section of the electorate is 
opposed to migration. In examining local, state, and national electoral data, I identified 
two nativist political parties in Mumbai, one in Bangalore, and none in Delhi. I then 
examined the impact of these parties in terms of their electoral performance, 
instigation of violence, and the ideological pressure they exerted upon mainstream 
parties. 
 
Mumbai 
Mumbai, once called Bombay, has long attracted migrants from different parts 
of India and the world.97 In 1955, as the old Bombay Presidency state was dissolved, 
Mumbai was given to the state of Maharashtra, which is home to the Marathi-speaking 
                                                 
97 Zachariah, K.C. “Bombay Migration Study: A Pilot Analysis of Migration to an Asian Metropolis.” 
Demography Vol.3 No.2.(1966): 378-392 
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Maharashtrians. This was the result of a prolonged agitation on the part of 
Maharashtrian regionalist movements that saw Mumbai, where Maharashtrians 
constituted the largest ethnic group, as a natural part of the state. The city remains well-
known for a cosmopolitan ethos and mind-boggling diversity, though this has at times 
clashed with the regional identity of Maharashtrians, the largest community in the city.98 
Thus, Mumbai is also home to India’s most successful nativist party, the Shiv Sena.  
Bal Keshav Thackeray, a cartoonist and journalist, launched the Shiv Sena at a 
rally in Mumbai’s (then Bombay) Shivaji Park in 1966 promising to secure the interests of 
Maharashtrians.99 In her 1979 study of the Shiv Sena, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein further 
notes that Mr. Thackeray raised the issue of “safeguarding jobs for Maharashtrians” well 
before this.100 Marmik, a Marathi-language weekly he launched in 1960, highlighted the 
prevalence of non-Maharashtrians in positions of power in the city.  
Shiv Sena grew as it attacked a succession of opponents. Its first foray into politics 
was a successful campaign against Krishna Menon, former Defense Minister and South 
Indian, who was running against the Congress party’s Maharashtrian candidate.101 
                                                 
98 For a thorough and page-turning account of contemporary Mumbai, see Suketu Mehta’s 
Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found 
99 Katzenstein, M.F. Ethnicity and equality: the Shiv Sena party and preferential policies in 
Bombay. Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press: 34. “In June 1966, Thackeray called a rally in Bombay’s Shivaji Park…the 
party was born.” Thackeray’s Shiv Sena would later change the official name of the city to its 
Marathi name of “Mumbai,” when it came to power at the state level. Shiv Sena, meaning 
“Shivaji’s Army” refers to Shivaji Bhonsle, a warrior-king and folk hero from Maharashtra who 
conquered a large empire in central India.  
100 Ibid 
101 Katzenstein: 34 
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Following the 1968 local elections, it became the largest opposition party in the city. This 
was impressive given the Congress party’s national dominance and strong presence in 
most states and municipalities at the time. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, Bal 
Thackeray secured the Marathi manoos (“Marathi-speaking person”) working-class 
vote. This came at the expense of the communists, as Thackeray emphasized ethnic 
identity over class identity and intimidated opponents.102 Starting in the 1980s, Shiv Sena 
entered into an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and took up Hindu 
nationalist (and anti-Muslim) rhetoric.103 This carried on into the 1990s, where the Shiv 
Sena played a leading role in riots that followed the 1993 demolition of the Babri Masjid 
in Ayodhya.104  
Since the beginning of this decade however, there was peace on the streets but 
tension between Bal Thackeray’s son Udhhav and his nephew Raj over who would 
succeed Bal Thackeray as leader.105 When dropped in favor of Uddhav, Raj Thackeray 
launched the breakaway Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (Maharashtra Reconstruction 
Army, MNS) in 2006 on promises of an inclusive sort of politics.106 However, it fared poorly 
                                                 
102 Juned Shaikh “Worker Politics, Trade Unions, and the Shiv Sena’s Rise in Central Bombay” EPW, 
April 30th 2005 
103 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1497 “Formed in 
1966 as a small, Mumbai-based outfit…” and “It has also been one of the earliest allies of the 
BJP….”  
104 Praveen Swami, “A welter of evidence” Outlook, 
<http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1716/17160110.htm>  
105 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1500 
106 BBC. “Ex-Shiv Sena leader sets up party” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4790358.stm 
(accessed December 20, 2008) 
43 
 
in Mumbai’s 2007 local elections while running on this platform.107 Following this 
lackluster showing, Raj Thackeray took to espousing the cause of the Marathi “sons of 
the soil.” This led to violence last year in which a student from Bihar, who was in Mumbai 
for the Indian Railways job examinations, was killed.108 It is this setting of   
 
Bangalore 
 The capital of Karnataka state, Bangalore has had a significant military and 
public sector presence since before independence and is home to one nativist party 
and several chauvinist groups. These organizations claim to be the protectors of the 
state’s native Kannadiga people and their language, Kannada. Yet in Bangalore, 
Kannadigas are at most a plurality, with the majority of residents claiming mother 
tongues other than Kannada (Table 3, pg 52).   
Nativist demands in Bangalore date back to the 1960s, when nativist politician 
Vatal Nagaraj first began campaigning in the name of the Kannadiga “sons of the 
soil.”109 His Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha (KCVP) party has contested elections in 
Bangalore and the rest of Karnataka state, though in the last 20 years he has been the 
                                                 
107 Rediff “Sena-BJP set to retain Mumbai” <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/feb/02poll.htm> 
(accessed October 16, 2008) 
108 Indian Express, “MNS Attack: Bihar boy dies, CM announces ex-gratia” 
<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mns-attack-bihar-boy-dies-cm-announces-
exgratia/376143/> (accessed January 1, 2008) 
109 Weiner: 291 and Nair, Janaki. The Promise of the Metropolis: Bangalore’s Twentieth Century 
Oxford University Press: 2005: 249, Vatal Nagaraj is mentioned both by Weiner and Nair, with the 
latter noting that one of his earliest political moves was to threaten to close, “with violence if 
necessary,” any cinema halls showing Tamil films in the city.  
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only member to win a state assembly seat (Table 12, Appendix pg. 69). In addition to 
the KCVP, there are assorted Kannada chauvinist groups engage in varying degrees of 
protests, strikes, and violence. Protests are organized and strikes called but in Bangalore, 
the nativist parties simply do not have as large a profile as a party like Shiv Sena has in 
Mumbai, nor have they engaged in as much violence.   
 
Electoral Performance 
 I analyzed Shiv Sena’s electoral performance in local, state, and national 
elections (Table 1) over the last two decades. Local and state election performance 
was measured specifically for Greater Mumbai’s 227 municipal seats and 34 state 
assembly seats respectively. National election performance however was measured 
across the entire state of Maharashtra. 
Table 1: The Shiv Sena's Electoral Performance 
Election (total seats) Year Seats Won Change Voteshare Change 
state (34) 1990 15 n/a 25.6% n/a 
state (34) 1995 18 3 29.9% 4.2% 
national (48) 1998 6 n/a 19.3% n/a 
national (48) 1999 15 9 20.1% 0.7% 
state (34) 1999 11 -7 25.4% -4.4% 
local (227) 2002 97 n/a 42.7% n/a 
national (48) 2004 12 -3 18.1% -2.0% 
state (34) 2004 9 -2 21.5% -4.0% 
local (227) 2007 83 -14 36.6% -6.2% 
Source: Election Commission of India, Times of India 
 Shiv Sena started to lose seats in the 1999 state elections. The lower the level of 
government, the more pronounced this downturn in Shiv Sena’s fortunes is. At the local 
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level, there was a 6.2% loss of voteshare and a loss of 14 seats from 2002 to 2007. Still, an 
alliance with the BJP allowed the Shiv Sena to remain in power. State assembly 
elections saw a decline of 4% vote share in both 1999 and 2004, with a loss of 7 and 
then 2 seats respectively. There are, however, some reasons to believe that the Shiv 
Sena’s decline may not represent a decline in local opposition to migration. 
 The Shiv Sena in the 1990s did not run on an exclusively “sons of the soil” agenda. 
Rather, it focused on Hindu nationalist rhetoric (and an anti-Muslim bias) that invoked 
the Babri Masjid issue, the 1993 riots, and its electoral alliance with the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP).110 Separating the effects of Hindu nationalism upon Shiv Sena’s electoral 
success from those of nativism is not possible. At times, it has seemed as if Shiv Sena’s 
Hindu nationalism dominated its nativism, with party chief Bal Thackeray encouraging 
the formation of “Hindu suicide squads.”111 Bal Thackeray’s son and likely successor, 
Uddhav Thackeray, also attempted to reach out to North Indian voters prior to his 
cousin Raj Thackeray’s anti-North Indian campaign.112  
Moroever, the recent rise of the MNS suggests that the “sons of the soil” issue still 
has some currency. The current, nativist agenda of the MNS will be tested in the 
                                                 
110 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1500 
111 International Herald Tribune “India police say they hold 9 from Hindu terrorist cell” 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/12/asia/12india.php> - Thackeray said in an editorial that 
“It is time to counter the same with Hindu terror. Hindu suicide squads should be readied to 
ensure the existence of Hindu society and to protect the nation.” – Mr. Thackeray did not 
however feel that his own sons were worthy of such a noble mission and declined to encourage 
them to join this outfit.  
112 Rediff “Analysis: What drove MNS to violence” < 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/08mns.htm> (accessed February 1, 2009):  Kumar Ketkar 
noted that "Uddhav was having these Uttar Bharatiya sammelans” 
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upcoming election but it will be too late for inclusion in this thesis. Still, Raj Thackeray 
failed to build a viable platform on his initially inclusive politics, winning a mere 7 seats in 
Mumbai’s 2007 local elections.113 He was outflanked by the Congress in the center-left 
space, by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) in the regional space, and by the Shiv 
Sena and BJP in the Hindu nationalist space. The Shiv Sena’s platform involved Hindu 
nationalism during the last few elections while the nativist platform of MNS remains 
unproven electorally. For these reasons, I find my analysis of the electoral performance 
of the Shiv Sena to be inconclusive. 
Turning to Bangalore, I sought to do a similar analysis of the nativist party’s 
electoral performance as an indicator of local opposition to migrants. The Kannada 
Chaluvali Vatal Paksha (KCVP), as mentioned earlier, has only secured one State 
Assembly seat. Its leader Vatal Nagaraj has consistently run, and often won, in the 
Chamarajnagar constituency of Southern Karnataka (Table 12, Appendix pg. 69). His 
performance in Chamarajnagar however, reveals nothing about nativist sentiment in 
Bangalore, where the KCVP has unsuccessfully fielded candidates over the years. 
Assuming the KCVP only contests elections when its nativist agenda has appeal, I took 
its contesting an election as an indication of nativist sentiment.   
                                                 
113 Rediff India Abroad  “Shiv Sena's votes cannot be broken: Uddhav Thackeray”, February 03, 
2007 <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/feb/03poll.htm> 
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Source: Election Commission of India 
 The trend in the number of candidates fielded suggests nativist sentiment 
declined in the 1990s only to rise again from the early part of this decade. However, not 
a single one of these candidates has actually won an election. In fact, the only 
member of the KCVP who has won an election in the last 20 years is Vatal Nagaraj, the 
party leader. This somewhat rude measure of nativist sentiment is thus inconclusive. It 
does indicate at the very least that nativist sentiment is less than in Mumbai, where such 
parties have governed at the local and state levels.   
 
Violence 
A political party can be influential even outside the electoral domain through 
strikes, mobilization, or violence. The impact of the Shiv Sena and MNS in Mumbai is 
more significant in terms of political violence. For the former, one can consider both 
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actual use of violence and coercion through the threat of violence. As Wilkinson’s 
argued, it is not that the state lacks the capacity to stop violence but rather whether it 
is electorally advantageous for the ruling party to stop or prevent ethnic riots.114 A 
nativist party’s instigating of violence with impunity would thus suggest its ideas have 
some electoral currency. The Shiv Sena has used violence and the threat of violence 
since its founding.115 The 1993 riots provide further proof of the Shiv Sena’s capacity for 
violence.116 Recently, we have the example of public disturbances following vandalism 
of a statue of Bal Thackeray’s wife.117 Raj Thackeray and MNS have also proven 
capable of instigating violence, most recently in October 2008.118 
In Bangalore’s case, violence has occurred but it has not been of the same 
magnitude in Mumbai nor has it been instigated with such impunity. Whereas in the 
case of Mumbai, Shiv Sena and MNS have deliberately instigated violence, in 
Bangalore some of the worst incidents of violence have occurred spontaneously. The 
2006 riots following the death of Rajkumar, the iconic Kannada-language film star, are a 
case in point.119 The spontaneity of the riots caught the police completely unaware and 
                                                 
114 Wilkinson: 6 “My central argument is that democratic states protect minorities when it is in their 
governments’ electoral interest to do so” 
115 Hansen, Thomas Blom Wages of Violence. Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay 
(Princeton University Press, 2001) 
116 Praveen Swami, “A welter of evidence” Outlook, 
<http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1716/17160110.htm> 
117 BBC “Hindu hardliners riot in Mumbai” < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5163288.stm> 
118 Livemint “Raj Thackeray arrested for MNS attack on north Indians” < 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/10/21101338/Raj-Thackeray-arrested-for-MNS.html> 
119 BBC. “Companies hit by Rajkumar riots” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4909432.stm> 
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resulted in many businesses, including multinational and Indian IT firms, closing down for 
the day. Rather than appeals for preferences for the “sons of the soil,” this mass 
mobilization produced only wanton property destruction, bodily injuries, and deaths.  
Premeditated protests, mobilization, and violence on the other hand, are usually 
not able to be launched with impunity. For example, the police recently thwarted a 
planned agitation against Tamil actor Rajnikanth’s new film by the KCVP and various 
Kannada chauvinist groups.120 In 2002, a peaceful strike over a river-sharing dispute with 
the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu went as planned, albeit with tight police 
surveillance and arrests of Vatal Nagaraj and other activists who were blocking 
traffic.121 Bangalore, in contrast to Mumbai, does not have nativist parties that are 
above the law and can act independently of the wishes of the authorities of the state. 
Strikes, protests, and other mobilizations occur peacefully and sometimes violently, but 
rarely without the consent and supervision of the state. These mobilizations indicate 
some support for nativist parties like the KCVP and its cause but not to the same extent 
as one sees in Mumbai.  
 
Ideological Pressure on Mainstream Parties 
In Mumbai, the impact of Shiv Sena and MNS has also been felt by mainstream 
political parties they compete with. Most recently, the Congress supported the notion of 
                                                 
120 The Hindu “Kannada groups suspend protests” 
<http://www.hindu.com/2008/04/06/stories/2008040653870400.htm> 
121 Hindu Business Line “Bandh paralyzes Bangalore city” 
<http://thehindubusinessline.com/bline/2002/09/13/stories/2002091301071700.htm> 
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giving preference to the “sons of soil” after MNS’s October 2008 attack on railway exam 
candidates.122 The renaming of Mumbai and its acceptance by all parties is another 
example of nativist ideas being accepted by the mainstream parties. Perhaps the most 
towering example of the Shiv Sena’s ideological pressure on mainstream parties was a 
surprising proposal by the Congress party to place a statue of Shivaji in the Arabian Sea, 
overlooking the city.123 I would argue that the Sena’s impact has been substantial in 
perhaps the cultural and symbolic arenas and in terms of preferential policies for the 
“sons of the soil.” It has not however been so influential as to push Congress, BJP, or 
other national parties to attack migrants.  
 On the other hand, the ideological impact of KCVP upon mainstream parties in 
Bangalore has been much more limited. The changing of the city’s official name from 
“Bangalore” to its Kannada name of “Bengaluru” in 2005 is one instance of nativist 
demands being met by mainstream parties in the state.124 Mainstream parties however 
have preferred to adopt such cultural demands rather than more contentious 
economic ones. As a case in point, the Sarojini Mahishi report’s recommendations for 
employment preferences for Kannadigas have long been in the news and will likely 
                                                 
122 Financial Express, “Cong sees no harm in sons-of-the-soil policy” Nov-05-2008, 
<http://www.financialexpress.com/news/cong-sees-no-harm-in-sonsofthesoil-policy/381415/> 
123 Rediff “300-feet Shivaji statue in Mumbai's Arabian Sea!” 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jun/03shivaji.htm 
124 Times of India “Bangalore to be renamed Bengaluru” (11 Dec 2005) – the Chief Minister at the 
time, N Dharam Singh, was a member of the Congress Party 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1327370.cms> 
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remain there.125 Indeed, the current Chief Minister, from the BJP, was willing to speak at 
length on Kannada being accorded classical language status while only briefly 
speaking about the Mahishi report.126 This further shows that the KCVP has exerted only 
limited ideological pressure on mainstream political parties in Bangalore.  
 At the same time, there are limitations to taking the impact of nativist political 
parties as a measure of local opposition to migrants. The activities of such parties do not 
give a clear indication of how salient the issue of migration and opposition to it actually 
are. Most obviously, levels of nativist sentiment in Delhi cannot be measured in this 
manner as Delhi does not have a nativist political party. Political parties act within a 
system and their rhetoric and actions (including violence) are framed in a certain 
manner. If there is local opposition to migration then it will be reflected in this framing of 
the issue. Examining the impact of nativist political parties is one way to understand this, 
from the perspective of actors within the system. A second way, from outside the 
system, would be analyzing how these issues are portrayed in the media. 
 
Content Analysis 
The media portrayal of migrants and migration in local media would ideally be 
examined across vernacular language print, television, radio, and even internet sources 
from the period of interest. Procedures must be clearly defined and consistently 
                                                 
125 2002 <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/07/24/stories/2002072401840300.htm> and 2005 
<http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/22/stories/2005082209220300.htm> and 2008 
<http://www.thehindu.com/2008/11/26/stories/2008112655130400.htm>  
126 2008 <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/11/26/stories/2008112655130400.htm>  
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applied. With this in mind, I conducted a content analysis of the major English language 
newspaper published in each city. Specifically, I scanned the archives of the Times of 
India (Mumbai), Deccan Herald (Bangalore), and Hindustan Times (Delhi) for mentions 
of the words “migrant” or “migration” and the name of the respective city within the 
same paragraph.  
As stated, I would ideally analyze all vernacular language media in each city. 
The daily newspaper was the most regularly issued and accessible format for a news 
source of local origin. While the major vernacular newspaper of each city would have 
been the ideal source, there are two reasons for which I chose a different approach. 
Firstly, I am not able to fluently read Marathi (Mumbai), Kannada (Bangalore), or Hindi 
(Delhi). Secondly, the advantage of using an English language newspaper with a 
primarily educated middle class and elite audience is that it can serve as a hard case 
for nativist sentiment. Nativist sentiment may influence coverage of migrants in 
vernacular media while having no impact on coverage in a city’s English newspapers, 
which reflect a more cosmopolitan ethos. However, if anti-migrant sentiment is 
substantial, then it is reasonable to assume that a city’s major English newspaper will 
reflect this in its portrayal of migrants. 
While comparing the portrayal of migrants in one paper to that in another is 
problematic due to the different bias of each paper, each city can be compared to 
itself. Factiva was used to search the archives of Hindustan Times (Delhi) and Times of 
India (Mumbai) from March 18th 1999 to March 18th 2009. For the Deccan Herald 
(Bangalore), the paper’s web archives and Google News Archives only provided 
articles from April 2nd 2005 to March 18th 2009.The portrayal of migrants in each article 
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was coded as positive (1), neutral (0), and negative (-1) in Table 11 (Appendix, pg. 69). 
The annual number of articles that negatively portrayed migrants was then obtained for 
each city (Tables 4, 5, and 6).  
I used the following criteria when coding articles. Any mentions of migrants as 
creating new businesses, improving their own lives or their community, or working on 
large, prestigious projects were coded as positive. Human interest stories profiling 
migrants, their neighborhoods, or their accomplishments were also coded as positive. 
Mentions of migrants exerting pressure on public services and infrastructure, illegally 
voting or using public services, committing crimes, or spreading disease were coded as 
negative. Whenever migration or migrants were referred to as a “problem,” the article 
was coded as negative. However, situations where an article offered both negative 
and positive portrayals of migrants were coded as neutral. Articles that simply reported 
an incident involving a migrant without referring to migrants in a positive or negative 
manner were also coded as neutral.  
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Source: Times of India 
The dashed vertical lines in Figures 2, 3, and 4 indicate an election year, with the 
level(s) of government noted. Interestingly, since 1999 the number of negative articles 
on migrants has fallen or remained the same during election years in Mumbai (Figure 2). 
It could be the case that opposition to migrants is not electorally advantageous. Thus, 
there are fewer stories on violence or statements of public figures against migrants. I do 
find this line of reasoning persuasive for the 1990s, when the Shiv Sena assumed a 
broader Hindu nationalist avatar.127 At the same time, 2008 saw the rise to prominence 
of Raj Thackeray’s MNS and an increase in negative articles on migrants. Prior to this, 
the Shiv Sena’s Hindu nationalist tendencies might have dominated its nativist ones as it 
                                                 
127 Suhas Palshikar “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” EPW 2004 April 3rd: 1497 
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sought to underplay the latter and expand beyond its “sons of the soil,” Marathi-
speaking base.   
 
Source: Deccan Herald 
 For the case of Bangalore, analysis of the Deccan Herald newspaper did show 
increased negative coverage of migrants in 2008, a state assembly election year. When 
the city’s official name was changed in 2005 to the original Kannada name of 
“Bengaluru,” Ramachandra Guha argued that this appeasement of nativist demands 
would lead to a decline in nativist sentiment.128 I would attribute the drop in negative 
                                                 
128 Ramachandra Guha, India Together. “Bangalore or Bengaluru? A divided city” (25 
December 2005): Mr. Guha, a Bangalorean and well-respected historian claimed that nativism 
had declined in Mumbai after its name change and hoped for the same in 
Bengaluru/Bangalore. 
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coverage from 2005 to 2006 to such a phenomenon. However, in 2008 the nativist KCVP 
did field three candidates in Bangalore as compared to only one in the last state 
election. Although they have yet to win an election, this willingness to contest more 
constituencies suggests that the 2005-2006 drop in nativist sentiment was only 
temporary. As the Deccan Herald’s archives were only available from 2005 to the 
present, I could not examine media portrayal of migrants during more than one 
election. Despite a key nativist demand being met, KCVP’s contesting more seats and 
the return of negative coverage of migrants indicate that nativist sentiment is present, 
but weak in Bangalore.  
 
Source: Hindustan Times 
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 In the case of Delhi, I found somewhat stronger nativist sentiment. The ideal 
measure of electoral performance was not possible as there are no nativist parties in 
Delhi. However, the above content analysis of the Hindustan Times’ coverage of 
migrants and migration suggests that there is local opposition to migrants (Figure 4). In 
the years of local and state elections, negative coverage of migrants has increased 
from the previous year. I do not believe these increases are merely coincidental. 
Negative coverage does not increase in national election years precisely because 
national elections do not concern issues particular to Delhi, such as migration.  
Moreover, state and local level public figures have weighed in on the issue. Most 
notably, Delhi Chief Minister Sheila Dixit of the Congress Party spoke disapprovingly of 
migrants from the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, resulting in controversy and a 
prompt apology.129 In Delhi, this indicates that while there is local opposition to migrants, 
they are present in such large numbers that it is politically damaging to attack them. 
Thus, no political party has emerged to champion the anti-migrant cause.  
 
Summary of Findings 
 My examination of the impact of nativist political parties and the media’s 
portrayal of migrants in the three cities shows levels of nativism in each city. I find that 
Mumbai and Delhi have high and medium levels of nativism respectively. In the former, 
                                                 
129 IBN Live “BJP demands Sheila Dixit’s resignation”  < http://ibnlive.in.com/news/bjp-demands-
sheilas-resignation/40179-15-2.html>: This was as bizarre a statement as it was controversial given 
that Mrs. Dixit was born in the state of Punjab. Furthermore, she represented Uttar Pradesh in the 
Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) prior to her career move to Delhi.  
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nativist appeals continue to allow instigation of violence with impunity while in the 
latter, the media and public figures take a dim view of migrants even if opposing them 
may not be electorally feasible. Bangalore on the other hand, is a case of low anti-
migrant sentiment that has given rise to a nativist party. This anti-migrant sentiment 
however is insufficient to help such a party win elections. All of these findings are 
summarized on the next page in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Levels of Nativism in each City 
Rank City  Level of Nativism Nativist Party 
1 Mumbai 
HIGH: Nativist parties have been electorally 
successful and instigated considerable 
violence with impunity. Lately, negative 
media coverage of migrants has increased. 
YES, there are Shiv Sena and 
Maharashtra Navnirman 
Sena (MNS). The latter split 
from Shiv Sena in 2006. 
3 
Bangalo
re 
LOW: There is the KCVP nativist party and an 
important nativist demand was implemented 
by mainstream politicians. Still, the KCVP has 
not won an election in Bangalore and cannot 
instigate violence with impunity.    
YES, there is the Kannada 
Chaluvali Vatal Paksha 
(KCVP). It has not won state 
elections in Bangalore. 
2 Delhi 
MEDIUM:  There is no nativist political party but 
negative coverage of migrants has 
consistently increased during state and local 
election years. High-ranking public figures 
have also made anti-migrant statements.  
NO such party is present. 
 
 
Explanation of Results 
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 There are several possibilities for explaining high nativist sentiment in Mumbai, low 
nativist sentiment in Bangalore, and medium nativist sentiment in Delhi. As a starting 
point, I examined the labor competition and political competition frameworks 
developed earlier (Theory, pg. 30) across the three cities. Labor competition was 
pertinent to nativism in Delhi, but provided an incomplete explanation. I subsequently 
found an alternative explanation of class prejudice to be more appropriate. For 
Mumbai, I identified political competition as the reason for local opposition to migrants. 
Finally, I considered an alternative explanation for Bangalore, viewing the diversified 
sources of migration as impeding political mobilization against migrants.  
 Both the labor competition and political competition explanations required that 
migrants be perceived as “culturally distinct.” There are multiple ways to define 
“cultural distinctiveness.” State borders are often linguistic and cultural borders, allowing 
one to reasonably assume that physical distance is a proxy for cultural distance. 
Another option is to use language itself as a measure of cultural distinctiveness. Both 
measures are given in Table 3: 
TABLE 3: Migrants by Birth and by Mother Tongue Language 
Urban Area 
Born Out of 
State 
Native (by Mother 
Tongue) 
National Capital Territory of 
Delhi 
38.4% 
80.9% 
Greater Mumbai Urban Area 26.5% 37.8% 
Bangalore (Urban) District 13.7% 41.5% 
Source: Census of India (2001), Tables D1 and C16 
 If interstate migration figures are used, the National Capital Territory of Delhi has 
clearly seen larger migration with 38.4% of its population born out of state. However, 
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using language as a measure of cultural distinctiveness suggests that relative to 
Mumbai and Bangalore, Delhi has not seen as much migration of “culturally distinct” 
persons as 80.9% are Hindi-speaking. Still, given Myron Weiner’s cautioning that “cultural 
differences, no matter how small” are relevant, I do consider this condition met in all 
three cities.130 At the very least, it is strongly met in Mumbai and Bangalore but only 
weakly met in Delhi. 
 
Labor Competition 
The labor competition explanation’s second condition was that the native ethnic 
group be relatively immobile. I take out-migration to in-migration ratios as a measure of 
the mobility of people native to a given state: 
 
 TABLE 4: Native 
Mobility 
State 
out-migrants as 
% of state of 
origin's current 
population 
in-migrants as 
% state of 
residence's 
population 
ratio of 
out-
migrants 
to in-
migrants* 
Jammu & Kashmir 2.2% 2.5% 90.2% 
Himachal Pradesh 7.4% 7.2% 103.6% 
Punjab 6.8% 6.7% 101.1% 
Chandigargh 16.9% 23.1% 73.2% 
Uttranchal 10.9% 10.5% 103.8% 
Haryana 8.3% 8.2% 100.4% 
NCT of Delhi 5.4% 6.7% 80.7% 
Rajasthan 4.9% 4.6% 105.5% 
Uttar Pradesh 5.8% 5.6% 104.0% 
                                                 
130 Weiner Sons of Soil, pg. 276 – “A second condition is that there must be some perceived 
cultural differences, no matter how small, between the migrants and the local community.” 
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Bihar 6.7% 6.3% 105.4% 
Sikkim 2.4% 2.7% 86.1% 
Arunachal 1.9% 2.1% 92.7% 
Nagaland 7.8% 8.0% 97.9% 
Manipur 2.5% 2.4% 104.1% 
Mizoram 4.1% 4.3% 95.5% 
Tripura 2.2% 2.1% 106.2% 
Meghalaya 2.2% 2.2% 101.8% 
Assam 2.6% 2.7% 98.2% 
West Bengal 2.2% 2.1% 103.1% 
Jharkhand 5.6% 5.5% 102.0% 
Orissa 2.6% 2.6% 102.9% 
Chhatisgargh 4.1% 4.1% 99.8% 
Madhya Pradesh 3.4% 3.3% 102.8% 
Gujarat 2.7% 2.7% 99.6% 
Daman & Diu 8.8% 8.0% 109.1% 
Dadra & Nagar 3.6% 3.5% 102.3% 
Maharashtra 2.2% 2.2% 100.3% 
Andhra Pradesh 2.1% 2.1% 104.1% 
Karnataka 3.7% 3.5% 106.2% 
Goa 6.4% 6.8% 94.7% 
Lakshadweep 2.8% 3.2% 88.3% 
Kerala 3.8% 3.3% 116.0% 
Tamil Nadu 2.8% 2.7% 104.2% 
Pondicherry 11.2% 10.5% 106.6% 
A & N Islands 2.5% 3.9% 64.7% 
Average: 4.1% 5.1% 98.8% 
*The higher the ratio, the more mobile a state’s population is (within India)  
Source: Census of India (2001), Tables D-1 and D-3?? 
 
 Table 4 shows Maharashtrians as having average mobility, natives of Karnataka 
having some of the highest mobility of any group in India, and Delhiites as having 
extremely low mobility. Although it might be ideal to isolate Bangalore and 
Maharashtra from their respective states, this was not possible. On the other hand, 
considering states may be best as the very concept of a “son of the soil” could be 
more ethnic than geographic. Per the usage in this thesis, it is a term used only to 
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denote members of the local ethnic group, wherever they reside.131 This question does 
not arise however in the case of Delhi as we are considering the entire union territory.  
 The third condition of increasing unemployment and native education levels is 
also met by Delhi if one looks at employment and literacy figures since liberalization. 
Bangalore and Mumbai again fail to meet the condition. As Table 5 shows, they have 
seen increasing education levels (literacy), but unemployment has fallen rather than 
increasing.   
Table 5: Male Education and Employment 
Male Youth (15 to 29 years) Unemployment 
in Urban Areas 
State-wide Male 
Literacy (All Ages) 
State 
1999-
2000 
2004-
2005 Change 1991 2001 Change 
Maharashtra 12.5% 8.1% -4.4% 76.6% 86.3% 9.7% 
Karnataka 7.0% 4.3% -2.7% 67.3% 76.3% 9.0% 
Delhi 7.9% 10.2% 2.3% 82.0% 87.4% 5.4% 
Source: National Human Development Report 2001, Planning Commission, Govt. 
of India and Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2375, dated 13.12.2005 
 
I looked specifically at male and youth unemployment because “youth bulges” 
and a surplus male population have been found to increase the risk of political 
violence.132 Urban unemployment figures for Maharashtra and Karnataka were 
substituted for Mumbai and Bangalore unemployment figures as the latter were not 
                                                 
131 This again brings us to the very difficult question raised in our introduction: when is it that a 
migrant becomes a local? Moreover, can a migrant or his or her descendents become “sons of 
the soil”? As mentioned earlier, I shall address this question in my conclusion. I assume 
throughout the paper that “sons of the soil” refers to the local ethno-linguistic group while 
“migrant” refers to migrants and their descendents who are not of this local ethnic group.  
132 Urdal, Henrik “Resources and Political Violence: A Sub-National Study of India 1956-2002” 
submitted for review to Journal of Conflict Resolution - Vol. 52, No. 4, 590-617 (2008)  
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available. Likewise, literacy rates were only available at the state level. Delhi’s 
increased male unemployment and literacy suggest that labor competition could 
account for Delhi’s medium level of nativist sentiment. Labor competition cannot 
however explain nativism in Mumbai or Bangalore.  
 
Delhi: A Matter of Class 
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that nativism in Delhi is motivated 
by something other than labor competition. Firstly, unemployment and literacy rates for 
Delhi are for the entire population of Delhi, 38.4% of which was born in other states 
(Table 6). Thus, the data in Table 5 is actually quite inconclusive on whether it is locals 
who are bearing the brunt of increased unemployment or migrants. Delhi is also the 
national capital, site of large out-migration and in-migration during Partition, and the 
destination for migrants from neighboring Hindi-speaking states. After migrants exceed 
a sufficiently large, “tipping point” share of the population, a nativist stance constitutes 
political suicide. The lack of a nativist party and reluctance of politicians to explicitly 
attack migrants, Sheila Dixit notwithstanding, confirm that this tipping point has long 
passed in Delhi.133  
In Delhi, I thus see local opposition to migrants as rooted in class prejudice rather 
than political competition or labor market competition. My content analysis of the 
Hindustan Times showed negative coverage of migrants increasing in local and state 
                                                 
133 BJP demands Sheila’s resignation – IBN- < http://ibnlive.in.com/news/bjp-demands-sheilas-
resignation/40179-15-2.html> Thu, May 10, 2007 
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election years. Nevertheless, English language newspapers such as the Hindustan Times 
are read primarily by the educated elite and professional middle class. Sheila Dixit and 
Lieutenant-Governor Tejendra Khanna, another public official upbraided for offending 
migrants, are both of this class.134 Most migrants meanwhile are not of this class.135 Their 
critics I would argue are overwhelmingly of the Anglophone professional and elite 
classes, given the negative coverage in Delhi’s major English daily.  
My interviews in two working-class migrant communities in Delhi corroborate a 
class prejudice account of nativism in Delhi.136 The migrants interviewed did not report 
any instances of migrants being told to leave Delhi by politicians. They also did not 
mention any resentment on the part of locals over jobs as working-class competition 
was overwhelmingly between migrants. They were however told (and felt) that they 
were “the very last” in line for access to public services. Moreover, when commercial, 
public transit, and road construction projects were undertaken, they were not 
consulted. By their own account, poor migrants such as themselves were what made 
such construction projects possible even if richer Delhiites looked down upon them. The 
labor competition explanation’s conditions were met to some degree in Delhi. 
                                                 
134 LG backtracks, row continues < 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/PoliticsNation/LG_backtracks_row_continues/articl
eshow/2681611.cms>  
135 Census of India (2001), Table D-8 – 70.5% of migrants to Delhi are employed in Agriculture, 
Hunting and Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing and repairs, Electricity, Gas 
and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, and 
Transport, Storage and Communications. The rest are employed in Real Estate, Renting and 
BusinessActivities, Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security, Education, 
Health and Social Work, Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities, Private 
Households with Employed Persons, and Extra-Territorial Organisations and Bodies. 
136 Interview: December 26th, Vayusenabad, Delhi, India 
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Nonetheless, only a class prejudice explanation can completely account for the 
particular source of local opposition to migrants and the lack of a nativist political party. 
 
Political Competition 
 Having examined the labor competition explanation, we now turn to the 
political competition explanation. The first condition, of culturally distinct migrants, was 
met in all three cases. The second condition, of a recent demographic change, can be 
understood in two respects. It can be understood as a simple increase in the number of 
migrants and their share of a city’s population, as has occurred in all three cities (Table 
6): 
Table 6: Migration Since Economic Liberalization* 
    1991 2001 
Migrant 
Population: 2095697 3171728 
Total Population: 9925891 11978450 
Greater 
Mumbai 
Urban Area Share of Migrants: 21.1% 26.5% 
Migrant 
Population: 556593 895632 
Total Population: 4839162 6537124 
Bangalore 
(Urban 
district) Share of Migrants: 11.5% 13.7% 
Migrant 
Population: 3333161 5318362 
Total Population: 9420644 13850507 
National 
Capital 
Territory of 
Delhi Share of Migrants: 35.4% 38.4% 
*A migrant is defined as any person born outside of the city 
Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1 
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Yet, it can also be understood as an increase in the share of migrants from 
certain states or regions. For example, migration to Mumbai from Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar has increased noticeably (Table 7). 
 
TABLE 7: The Greater Mumbai 
Urban Area: 1991 2001 
Top 15 States of Origin for Migrants Total Migrants 
Share of 
Population 
Total 
Migrants 
Share of 
Population 
States in India beyond the state of enumeration 2095697 21.11% 3171728 26.48% 
Punjab 28460 0.29% 29128 0.24% 
Haryana 11820 0.12% 17076 0.14% 
Delhi 18290 0.18% 26843 0.22% 
Rajasthan 120500 1.21% 200850 1.68% 
Uttar Pradesh 712570 7.18% 1240020 10.35% 
Bihar 51900 0.52% 158597 1.32% 
West Bengal 40230 0.41% 104151 0.87% 
Orissa 13800 0.14% 40114 0.33% 
Madhya Pradesh 36570 0.37% 53083 0.44% 
Gujarat 439260 4.43% 496271 4.14% 
Andhra Pradesh 84930 0.86% 125069 1.04% 
Karnataka 242137 2.44% 302348 2.52% 
Goa 38360 0.39% 31809 0.27% 
Kerala 108290 1.09% 114568 0.96% 
Tamil Nadu 128210 1.29% 161715 1.35% 
 Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1 
 At present, Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena and other political 
parties have attacked migrants from UP and Bihar both physically and rhetorically, 
further confirming that Mumbai has undergone “sudden demographic change.”137 With 
elections approaching in April of 2009, this has also included a war of words with 
                                                 
137 News articles on Raj Thackeray’s MNS and other parties too issuing statements or “taking 
action” against North Indian migrants 
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politicians from Bihar and UP.138 This would suggest that the third condition, an electoral 
incentive to take a nativist stance, is also present in Mumbai. Beyond the MNS, the 
Nationalist Congress Party and Shiv Sena have also issued similar nativist appeals.139  
 
Mumbai: The Return of the Nativist 
The return of the nativist agenda in Mumbai can be attributed primarily to Raj 
Thackeray and his Maharashtra Navnirman Sena. I am interested however in what 
motivated him to take this nativist stance and instigate violence in the name of the 
“sons of the soil.” One way to understand political competition and ethnic violence is in 
terms of the Effective Number of Votes Parties, as detailed by Wilkinson in his Votes and 
Violence.140 Generally, situations of 3 or more effective parties preclude violence of the 
sort MNS instigated in 2008. Indeed, it is unusual that a city with as many parties as 
Mumbai should witness as much violence. 
To understand Raj Thackeray’s actions since leaving the Shiv Sena in 2006, I 
initially found the literature on marketing and strategy useful. Raj Thackeray sought to 
secure political space for himself, as a new entrant in the market for political parties. 
Unfortunately, he did not realize that his new Maharashtra Navnirman Sena party was 
competing in a segmented market. Segmenation implies that a given brand’s (or 
                                                 
138 Some quote of Raj or Bal attacking Lalu or Mulayam Singh Yadav 
139 NCP and others showing support for “Maharashtra” and “maharastrian sentiment” etc after 
Railway Attacks 
140 Votes and Violence, Wilkinson 
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political party’s) “market is limited (i.e. there are some consumers you need not sell 
to).”141 The consumers, or rather voters, he fruitlessly attempted to sell his party to 
normally voted for the Congress Party or Nationalist Congress Party. I would argue that 
his rather generic “brand” fared poorly amongst secular, progressive types as the 
established Congress “brand” had an incumbency advantage in this segment.142 He 
also failed to differentiate himself sufficiently from the regional party within this segment, 
Sharad Pawar’s Nationalist Congress Party (NCP).  
Raj Thackeray’s long association with the Shiv Sena meant he simply could not 
build a credible platform wrest the secular, Left-of-Center space from the Congress and 
NCP. Migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar meanwhile were voting for local units of 
parties from their states. Thus, MNS narrowed its focus to the Marathi manoos (“Marathi 
person”) segment of the electorate. Raj’s alma mater, the Shiv Sena, was dominant in 
this segment although Raj Thackeray’s past association with the Shiv Sena lent 
credibility to the MNS “brand.” However, the MNS had to differentiate its product, i.e. 
platform, from that of Shiv Sena as Shiv Sena had an incumbency advantage.143 
                                                 
141 Pg. 49, European Journal of Marketing, Vol 30 No 12, 1996, “Market segmentation for 
competitive brands,” Kathy Hammond, A.S.C Ehrenberg, and G.J. Goodhart  
142 The Five Forces That Shape Competitive Strategy, Michael E. Porter, Harvard Business Review, 
January 2008 – A revision of his earlier 1979, Harvard Business Review published “How 
Competitive Forces Shape Strategy” <http://hbr.harvardbusiness.org/2008/01/the-five-
competitive-forces-that-shape-strategy/ar/1> 
143 Pg. 4, Journal of Marketing, April 1987 Market Segmentation, Product Differentiation, and 
Marketing Strategy, Peter R. Dickson and James L. Ginter, Vol 52 No 2 – “A product offering is 
perceived by the consumer to differ from its competiton on any physical or non-physical 
product characteristic, including price.” 
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Raj Thackeray and MNS effected this differentiation through a process of ethnic 
outbidding, or establishing a platform towards one of the extremes of the political 
spectrum.144 Specifically, this was a far-right nativist stance against migrants from Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh, with violence reminiscent of the Shiv Sena’s anti-South Indian 
campaigns in earlier years.145 In doing so, Raj sought to outflank the Shiv Sena by going 
to the right of them. I would also contend that the Shiv Sena and MNS are not the only 
players in this game.  
  Political competition in India has sometimes seen dominant parties take 
imprudent actions in the name of short-sighted “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” 
logic. In the late 1970s, Indira Gandhi’s Congress party supported a Sikh extremist, 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, in the hopes that he would outbid and split the supporters 
of Punjab’s Akali Dal regional party.146 The result was much unnecessary bloodshed that 
only ended in the 1990s. Jawaharlal Nehru’s engineering of a split in Kashmiri leader 
Sheikh Abdullah’s party in 1953 created similar resentment that gave rise to an 
insurgency in Kashmir that persists to this day.147 I consider the rise of Raj Thackeray and 
the MNS to be another instance of such politics. 
                                                 
144 Kanchan Chandra - 2005, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.”  Perspectives on Politics.  
Vol 3(2): 236 – “The terms outbidding and centrism refer to the location of party positions on a 
given dimension. Outbidding occurs when parties assume positions toward the endpoints on this 
dimension. Centrism describes the assumption of positions closer to the middle.” 
145 Times of India “For the Soul of Sena” 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/TODAYS_EDITORIAL_For_the_Soul_of_Sena/articlesh
ow/2756871.cms> 
146 “Making Federalism Work” Journal of Democracy 9.3 (1998) James Manor 
147 “Making Federalism Work” Journal of Democracy 9.3 (1998) James Manor 
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 There is reason to believe that Raj Thackeray has been encouraged by the 
Congress and perhaps even the NCP in his new political venture. In the 2004 State 
Assembly elections, 15 out of the 34 constituencies in Mumbai were won with a margin 
of victory of less than 10% (Table 8). Of these 15 close races, 10 involved the Shiv Sena 
and 6 (involving the Shiv Sena) were within a 5% margin.  
Table 8: Mumbai Constituencies with a 10% or less Margin of 
Victory in the 2004 State Elections 
Constituency Margin of Victory Winner Runner-Up 
Chembur 2.1% INC BJP 
Mazgaon 2.3% SHS NCP 
Mahim 2.8% SHS INC 
Bhandup 3.2% NCP SHS 
Malbar Hill 4.0% BJP INC 
Matunga 4.2% INC BJP 
Andheri 4.5% INC SHS 
Malad 4.7% SHS INC 
Amboli 5.8% INC SHS 
Kandivali 6.4% INC BJP 
kherwadi 6.5% INC SHS 
Goregaon 6.9% SHS NCP 
Vileparle 7.9% INC SHS 
Nagpada 8.1% INC SHS 
Khetwadi 8.3% INC BP 
 Source: Election Commission of India 
 This number of extremely close elections suggests that there would be every 
reason for the Congress party and NCP to support a party like MNS. By its stance and 
attempts to outbid the Shiv Sena with its anti-North Indian campaign, the MNS does not 
compete directly for votes with either the Congress or NCP. The only party it directly 
competes, the only party focusing on the same Marathi manoos segment of the 
electorate, is the Shiv Sena. Informed observers such as Kumar Ketkar, editor the 
Marathi daily Loksatta, and Vaibhav Purandare, who has closely followed Shiv Sena, 
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have suggested such a game is being played by the Congress.148 Anonymous sources 
within the Congress party have also admitted as much to the media.149 
 What is most revealing however is that the state of Maharashtra’s Congress 
government has allowed Raj Thackeray to run amok in its capital, raising tensions 
between Hindi-speaking migrants and the Marathi “sons of the soil.” Wilkinson’s central 
argument is at work here as it is in the electoral interest of the Congress government to 
not protect an ethnic minority, Hindi-speaking migrants, from Raj Thackeray’s men. The 
Congress wished to maximize the salience of voters’ regional identities so that Hindi-
speaking migrants desert the Shiv Sena and the Marathi vote splits between Shiv Sena 
and MNS. Over the next month, we shall know if this strategy succeeded electorally. In 
the long run however, the Congress may come to regret condoning chauvinism and 
lawlessness for reasons of electoral expediency. Whatever the outcome, nativism in 
Mumbai is clearly a product of political competition.  
 
 
Bangalore 
For Bangalore, neither the labor nor political competition explanations 
adequately explain the low level of nativism I observed. Culturally-distinct, interstate 
                                                 
148 Rediff India Abroad “Analysis: What drove Raj Thackeray's party to violence” Krishnakumar P, 
February 08, 2008, < http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/08mns.htm> 
149 The Times of India “Raj says will revive anti-migrant drive” 26 Mar 2008, 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Raj_says_will_revive_anti-
migrant_drive/articleshow/2899642.cms> 
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migrants form only 13.7% of Bangalore’s population (Table 9). However, Kannada-
speakers are only 41.5% of the city’s population, indicating that migrants and their 
descendents form a majority of the city’s population as in Mumbai. Those born in 
Karnataka are amongst the most geographically mobile of all Indians, further negating 
labor competition’s explanatory power.  
The inadequacy of a political competition explanation is most revealed by the 
inability of the KCVP to win elections in Bangalore. This suggests that the third condition, 
electoral incentives for an anti-migrant stance, is only weakly met. In terms of the 
second condition of a sudden demographic change, migration to Bangalore has 
grown but not as fast as migration to Mumbai. Moreover, no single state’s share has 
grown as prominently as those of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar did in Mumbai:  
TABLE 10: Bangalore District 1991 2001 
Top 10 States of Origin for 
Migrants 
Total 
Migrants 
Share of 
Population 
Total 
Migrants 
Share of 
Population 
States in India beyond the 556593 11.50% 895632 13.70% 
Tamil Nadu 286873 5.93% 388615 5.94% 
Andhra Pradesh 93850 1.94% 169985 2.60% 
Kerala 85730 1.77% 128608 1.97% 
Rajasthan 17030 0.35% 42885 0.66% 
Maharashtra 20220 0.42% 33006 0.50% 
Uttar Pradesh 10430 0.22% 24229 0.37% 
West Bengal 6590 0.14% 21731 0.33% 
Bihar 6280 0.13% 19797 0.30% 
Gujarat 5800 0.12% 13034 0.20% 
Orissa 2280 0.05% 11088 0.17% 
Source: Census of India (1991, 2001), Table D-1 
From Table 10, we can see that there has been no great increase in the share of 
migrants from one state or region as was the case with Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in 
Mumbai. Though migrants from Tamil Nadu constitute nearly 6% of the population in 
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both 1991 and 2001, this share remains constant. In Mumbai, the identifiable 
concentration of migrants from one region is in my view culturally threatening, political 
consequences aside. Similar concentrations of migrants have produced fears of 
“swamping” and loss of local culture the world over. A case in point would be fears in 
the United States that Hispanic immigrants are not assimilating into the mainstream 
culture as earlier immigrants did.150 In Bangalore however, such fears do not arise as the 
stream of migration is diversified and has not changed greatly in composition. 
However, it could the case that Kannada-speakers in Bangalore feel 
economically excluded as outsiders capture most of the labor and capital share of 
gains from the city’s astounding growth. The best jobs will more often than not be filled 
by outsiders rather than “sons of the soil.” The simple reason for this is that the demand 
for high-level skills and education cannot be fully met in Karnataka. This in some ways 
resembles the situation of native Tibetans vis-à-vis Hui and Han Chinese migrants.151 
Moreover, Myron Weiner in Sons of the Soil saw “blockage to economic mobility for the 
native population by a culturally distinguishable migrant population” as the central 
motivation for “sons of the soil” agitation.152 The growth of Bangalore’s IT and other high-
skills industries through recruiting from all parts of India is certainly not blocking mobility 
for Kannadiga. This growth however could be creating high expectations of mobility 
that are not met, leading to resentment at outsiders who are getting the “best jobs.”  
                                                 
150 “The Hispanic Challenge” Samuel P. Huntington, Foreign Policy, No. 141 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), 
pp. 30-45 
151 This is somewhat akin to the case of Tibetan economic exclusion in China (Theory, pg. 22), 
though in the Indian case Kannadigas are of course able to participate politically.  
152 Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978: 285  
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Thus, Bangalore’s low level of nativism can be attributed to a class divide that 
superficially resembles an ethnic division of labor, as outsiders are overrepresented 
amongst Bangalore’s nouveau riche.”153 This situation is obviously resented by 
Kannadigas, yet does not constitute a true ethnic division of labor as it is neither driven 
by parochial concerns nor static.154 Rather, the present division of labor is due to the 
fact that IT and other high-skills industries have had to recruit far and wide for 
specialized skills that are in short supply.155 There is a class aspect to anti-migrant 
sentiment in Bangalore, given the increased labor competition that migrants have 
created for the most sought after jobs. Nativism in Bangalore is low however because 
migration is diversified rather than concentrated from a single region, impeding 
effective mobilization against migrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz Pg. 108 – Horowitz defines ethnic division of labor as 
“ethnic specialization of occupation in general; the phenomenon is not confined to “labor” in 
the narrow sense.” He further writes that “The concentration of particular ethnic groups in 
particular sectors of the economy and in particular occupations within sectors is a feature of 
many societies, but it reaches its apogee in the ex-colonial countries.”  
154 It is hard to imagine Kannadigas are receive unfair treatment from IT and other new industries 
when Infosys, a leading IT firm, has a large proportion of employees and upper management 
that is Kannadiga. In 2007 the head of human resources, a Kannadiga himself, claimed nearly 
half their employees were Kannadigas (The Hindu “Jaipur an emerging IT hotspot: Infosys official” 
http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/12/stories/2007011202881500.htm)   
155 “NASSCOM fears shortage of staff for knowledge industry by 2010” The Hindu Dec 17 2005  
75 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the results of this thesis, I have my initial hypotheses to revisit and three 
conclusions to offer. My hypotheses were only partially correct. Mumbai, as predicted, 
had a high level of nativism due to political competition. For Bangalore, I found only a 
low level of nativism rather than medium level I had predicted as conditions for political 
and labor competition-induced nativism were only partially met. Elements of labor 
competition, especially for very high-skilled jobs, and a class divide between high-skilled 
outsiders and locals, explained nativist sentiment in Bangalore. The predicted “sudden 
demographic change” was also absent as there was no concentration of migrants 
from one single region. In Delhi meanwhile, I found a medium level of nativist sentiment 
rather than the expected low level. I attributed this to class prejudice rather than labor 
competition given that such a large share of Delhi’s population was born out of state.  
My first conclusion is that political mobilization against migrants is easiest when 
there is a concentration of migrants from one region or of one ethnicity. This conclusion 
accounts for the ease with which Raj Thackeray launched his anti-North Indian 
campaign amidst increasing migration from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to Mumbai. It also 
explains the difficulty Vatal Nagaraj’s KCVP has faced in opposing the more diversified 
stream of migration into Bangalore. 
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My second conclusion is that once the population share of migrants exceeds a 
tipping point, nativist political mobilization is no longer electorally feasible. Delhi is a 
case in point, as first-generation migrants comprise almost 40% of the city’s population 
and no politician dares oppose them. Some American states and immigration gateway 
cities, where the Hispanic population has grown tremendously, would also fit this 
pattern.  
Taken together, these two conclusions imply that there is a window of 
opportunity for local opposition to migrants to mobilize and have an impact. If a 
significant share of migrants are of a particular region or ethnicity and their numbers do 
not yet exceed a tipping point, then an effective nativist party can form. This is precisely 
what happened in 1966 with the formation of Shiv Sena and will have occurred once 
again if the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena fares well in April. In Delhi on the other hand, 
this window of opportunity has passed. 
 My third conclusion is that the degree of success of nativist parties is a function of 
the strength of national parties at the state and local levels. The BJP and Congress are 
dominant in Delhi and compete in Bangalore with the Janata Dal (Secular), a regional 
party with national aspirations and a former Prime Minister at its head. This is most 
exemplified by Raj Thackeray’s nativist niche strategy as he has few prospects at the 
national level and faces weak national parties (Congress and BJP) in Mumbai.  
These conclusions raise some broader, historical questions of nation and 
community. Is it possible for interstate migrants or their descendents to become “sons of 
the soil”? Or is the central premise of nativism, that a given group has the prime claim 
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to the territory in which it has historically resided, destined to become the norm? With 
the decline of the Congress party, India’s party system has fragmented and regional 
parties have grown in strength.156 The likely result of increased sub-nationalism will be 
greater nativist sentiment and political mobilization, at the expense of a broader Indian 
identity. 
At the same time, the economic logic of internal migration will remain 
compelling. Current literature has noted that destination cities or regions gain from 
“labor mobility driven by economic reasons” as such migration concentrates people 
and talent there.157 The recently released World Development Report for 2009 also 
noted increased population mobility in India.158 As migration continues, additional cities 
may join Delhi with their migrant population share passing the tipping point. In such a 
scenario, nativist demands would become politically untenable in these cities and 
regions, as they are in Delhi. The question then becomes one of which effect 
dominates: party fragmentation and regionalized politics or demographic 
transformation due to continued migration? 
On a closing note, I remain optimistic as the process of internal migration itself 
may strengthen a national, Indian identity over sub-national identities that facilitate 
nativism. In a forthcoming book, Devesh Kapur argues that increased mobility of people 
                                                 
156 Mehta, PB. “India: Fragmentation amid Consensus.” Journal of Democracy 8.1 (1997): 56-69 
157 World Development Report 2009 "Reshaping Economic Geography." Washington DC: The 
World Bank Group, 2009: 147 
158 World Development Report 2009 "Reshaping Economic Geography." Washington DC: The 
World Bank Group, 2009: 163 
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through Hindu pilgrimage routes, British-era railways, and the post-independence public 
sector created broader conceptions of identity.159 For children of public sector 
employees growing up outside their native state, the “identity that became more 
prominent in their repertoire was ‘Indian’.”160 Furthermore, these “cosmopolitan” effects 
held for poorer migrants as well. For these reasons, I believe that in spite of regional 
parties’ growth, the very mobility that provokes nativism will ultimately foster a national, 
“Indian” identity.  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table 11: Portrayal of Migrants in Major Local Newspapers 
3/18/99 to 3/18/09 4/2/05 to 3/18/09 
  Mumbai Delhi Bangalore Mumbai Delhi 
Number of Articles 
(n): 138 155 80 76 90 
Positive (1): 
36 
(26.09%) 
30 
(19.35%) 
28 
(35.00%) 
25 
(32.89%) 
21 
(23.33%) 
Neutral (0): 
36 
(26.09%) 
60 
(38.71%) 
18 
(22.50%) 
23 
(30.26%) 
29  
(32.22%) 
Negative (-1): 
66 
(47.83%) 
65 
(41.94%) 
34 
(42.50%) 
28 
(36.84%) 
40 
 (44.44%) 
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Mean Portrayal*: -0.22 -0.23 -0.08 -0.04 -0.21 
*Higher mean implies more positive portrayal 
Source : Times of India, Deccan Herald, and Hindustan Tim 
 
 
Table 12: Kannada Chaluvali Vatal Paksha's 
Electoral Performance: Chamarajnagar State 
Assembly Constituency 
Year Voteshare Seat Won Change 
1989 38.8% yes n/a 
1994 26.7% yes -12.1% 
1999 27.2% no 0.6% 
2004 32.0% yes 4.8% 
2008 9.2% no -22.8% 
Source: Election Commission of India 
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